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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1989, Poland was the first country out of the former Soviet block to
reestablish political democracy and initiate an economic and social chang-
over to a market economy. Similarly to other Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries, the boundary conditions of this transition were dictated by
virtual isolation from other parts of the world until the late 1980s.
While the countries of this region took their first steps in a highly challeng-
ing process of transition from a centrally planned economy into a full-fledged
market economy, globalization exposed national economies worldwide to a
much more intense competition than ever before, driven by an accelerating
pace of technological change, by trade and investment liberalization, and by
growing importance of supranational rules.
On the one hand, rapid advancement in the process of transition accom-
panied by full participation in the global economy enabled CEE countries
and their economic agents to grasp the new opportunities and reap the ben-
efits of globalization. On the other hand, the departure from the socialist
system brought new threats such as unemployment, stratification of society,
poverty, or growing disparities in regional development.
In Poland, the overall income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient
appears to have increased quite modestly in the course of transition - con-
siderably less, for example, than in Ukraine, Russia, the Baltic States and
Bulgaria.1 However, among transition countries, Poland did witness one of
1See Keane and Prasad (2001). As noted by Newell and Socha (2005), the main force
contracting wage inequality in Poland through the 1990s was a decline in a participation
of low skilled workers in the labor force.
1
the most pronounced increases in labor earnings inequality.
In particular, the skill premium2, which had been artificially suppressed
during the socialist rule, grew at an breathtaking average rate of 4.2 percent
per year between 1990 and 2002, compared to an average of 0.72 percent
per year between 1979 and 1990 in the United States, which was enough to
be referred to as “dramatic” by several economists. The increase in relative
wages was accompanied by an increase in relative demand for skilled workers.
Even though the growth of relative employment was not so sharp and stable
as the growth of relative wage, on average it increased by 0.92 percent which
is all but a negligible number.
Regarding the spatial aspect of the transformation process in Poland, it
has not diminished but rather reinforced old regional disparities. It is the
urban agglomerations with a large share of market services and some of the
western regions that have enjoyed the most favorable socio-economic situa-
tion in Poland. As part of the economic development strategy, the Polish
government attempt to stimulate the economic activity by tax exemptions
and public grants in lagging regions and those facing restructurization prob-
lems. In particular, policy makers aim at attracting foreign investment, which
is assumed to be eminently beneficial for host locations in Poland. In this
context, the factors determining the location decisions of multinational firms
are of vital importance for design of appropriate policies to draw the attention
of foreign firms to economically disadvantaged regions.
The two main questions addressed in this thesis are related to topics
associated with Poland’s transition process described above:
• To what extent is the increasing skill premium in Poland an effect of
Poland’s integration into the world economy?
• What are the determinants of spatial distribution of activity of hori-
zontal and vertical FDI in Poland?
Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to verification of different explanations of
increasing inequality between wages of high skilled and low skilled workers
2Measured here as non-production to production workers’ wages in manufacturing.
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proposed in the theoretical literature, while Chapter 4 investigates the driving
forces behind the activities of foreign firms in Poland.
Even though economists agree that relative wage changes are due to an
increase in the relative demand for skilled labor, we observe an ongoing dis-
cussion about the source of the demand shift itself. This debate is concen-
trated around three issues. The first one is that proliferation of computers
and related technologies have caused a change in production techniques to-
ward those biased in favor of skilled workers. The next one focuses on free
trade and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, according to which trade affects
relative factor reward by changing relative prices of goods. The third one
associates growing relative demand for high skilled labor with international
outsourcing, either by relocating a part of firms’ activities to foreign external
suppliers of intermediaries, or by offshoring i.e. shifting fragments of pro-
duction to a foreign country within the firm in the form of vertical direct
investment. Outsourcing allows, among others, imports of labor intensive
inputs from low wage countries.
Taking into account that the increase of wage inequality in Poland has
been accompanied by dramatic economy-wide changes: overnight liberaliza-
tion of prices and trade, a changing production structure and growing foreign
involvement in the country, all the above described explanations may be rele-
vant. On the other hand, under the socialist regime Poland was characterized
by an extremely compressed wage distribution. Thus, one of the dimensions
of the transition process was the liberalization of wage determination mech-
anism. As a consequence, the increase in wage inequality across skills in
Poland might partly reflect pure labor market adjustments.
An increase of wage disparity itself is not a new phenomenon. Since 1980,
many high income countries have experienced widening gaps between high
skilled and low skilled workers in terms of wages and employment.3 While
3This refers to Anglo-Saxon countries such as: the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom and Australia, while in the 1990s, continental European countries like Germany
and Austria exhibited low and stagnating, or even decreasing (in the case of Austria) wage
inequality. Marin (2004) and Lorentowicz, Marin and Raubold (2005) suggest that this
is a result of human capital scarcity in these two countries. See also Bertola (2003) for
comparison of wage inequalities among developed countries.
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such events are worth paying attention to on their own, the fact that Poland
and other transition countries, whose economic structures still differ from
those of developed countries, repeated the experience of the latter regarding
increasing skill premia makes it even more interesting. This is because the
above described relative wage movements do not exhibit a pattern of devel-
opment of factor prices that is usually expected by trade economists. The
Heckscher-Ohlin theory states that trade between a high skilled labor abun-
dant country and a low skilled labor abundant country should decrease the
relative wage of low skilled workers in the skill rich trading partner. The op-
posite holds true for its skill poor trading counterpart. Following this scheme,
if developed countries witness a rise in wage inequality between high skilled
and low skilled workers, then their low skilled labor abundant and often less
developed trading partners should observe the opposite trend.
Although, due to differences in structure and quality of education systems
worldwide, it is rather difficult to obtain a clear-cut comparison of high skilled
labor endowments among countries, data on educational composition of labor
force collected by the International Labour Organization (ILO) presented in
Table 1.1 suggests that Poland is less skill abundant than most of its trading
partners coming predominantly from the pre-2004 European Union. That is,
one would rather expect international trade to diminish the wage disparity
in Poland than to raise it.
The increasing skill premium in Poland is nonetheless consistent with
predictions of the model of international outsourcing developed by Feenstra
and Hanson (1996a). In short, in this model advanced countries outsource
their low skill intensive activities to low wage countries. From the perspective
of the host country these activities are however high skill intensive, therefore
the relative demand for high skilled labor increases in both, home and host
country. Empirical analysis of the influence of outsourcing on the widening
gap between high skilled and low skilled workers in Poland is presented in
Chapter 2 of this thesis.
In a world of many products and production factors, the statement of
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, whose predictions for wage determination were
4
Table 1.1: Skill Endowments of Main Trading Partners of Poland in 1998
share of high skills share in share in
in total labor force a export b import b
Belgium 30.4 2.5 2.8
Czech Republic 10.5 3.6 3.1
Denmark 24.7 2.7
France 23.7 4.7 6.5
Germany 23.4 36.3 25.8
Holland 25.7 4.8 3.8
Italy 10.5 5.9 9.4
Russia 54.0 5.6 5.1
Sweden 27.8 2.9
United Kingdom 24.3 3.9 4.9
United States 58.9c 2.7 3.8
Poland 14.8
a Defined as a third level share in total labor force in percent, according
to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-76).
b Top 10 shares in total export and import, in percent.
c In 2002, data for 1998 not available.
Source: LABORSTA, International Labour Organization
briefly outlined above, is not so strong. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
itself, which provides a link between changes in prices of goods and changes in
prices of production factors, appears to hold much more generally. Therefore,
in order to scrutinize the influence of international trade on development
of relative wages, one has to analyze first, how price changes depend on
international trade. Chapter 3 of this thesis employs the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem to investigate the role of international trade and technology played
in the increase of the skill premium in Poland.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from the skill premium to the analysis of spatial
determinants of FDI distribution. Given the above mentioned disparities in
the regional development in Poland, understanding of FDI location decisions
is of vital importance for policy makers who would like to employ direct in-
5
vestment of multinational firms to stimulate the economic development of
disadvantaged regions. It can also assist in the assessment of the real com-
petitiveness of regions in terms of location advantages able to complement
organizational chains of multinational firms.
The theoretical literature distinguishes between two fundamental types
of foreign investment. Market-seeking, or horizontal FDI replicates the pro-
duction of the same goods and services in both the home and host country
to access local markets. On the other hand, export-oriented, or vertical FDI
fragments the production of goods or services into stages located in different
countries and is targeted at re-exporting final or intermediate products into
the home country or into other countries. Since these two basic types of FDI
have different kinds of motivation, it is important to analyze their determi-
nants separately. Chapter 4 investigates and compares the location factors
of both types using data of Polish regions between 1996 and 2003.
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the thesis.
6
Chapter 2
FDI and the Skill Premium in
Poland
2.1 Introduction
During the 1990s, wages of high skilled workers in Poland increased dramati-
cally relative to those of their less skilled counterparts. Economists analyzing
such wage developments in other countries have concluded that the primary
cause was a raise in relative demand for high skilled workers, since at the
same time also relative employment of these workers increased. Three promi-
nent explanations for this shift in relative demand proposed in the theoretical
literature were outlined in Chapter 1. The first one is related to technological
progress which is biased toward skilled labor. The second one is associated
with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which describes wage determination in
the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and shows that decreasing prices of low skill
intensive products induce a fall in wages of low skilled labor. The third
explanation focuses on outsourcing activities by multinational firms.
In this chapter the outsourcing hypothesis is tested. In particular, I ana-
lyze the relationship between foreign direct investment and the rising demand
for skilled labor in Poland. As noted in Chapter 1, over the past decade the
occurrence of increasing wage inequality was accompanied by an advancing
process of international economic integration of Poland. One of the major
7
elements of the latter was an enormous inflow of foreign capital. By incor-
porating the Polish labor force into the international labor division, foreign
investors possibly had an impact on the observed labor market adjustments.
Furthermore, as argued by Dunning (1958) and Hymer (1976) foreign firms
have to be superior to local firms in terms of technology, management or or-
ganizational skills, in order to overcome the disadvantages related to activity
in the relative unknown market. Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2002)
reported that in the case of about 30 percent of investment projects under-
taken by German multinationals in Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, the parent firm originates in a superior- or high-technology sector.
They conclude, that German direct investment in CEE countries seems to
be an important vehicle of technology spillovers for host countries. That is
the development of foreign firms’ activities is presumed to have stimulat-
ing effects on the economy as local firms gain better access to technology
and management know-how and are integrated into global production and
distribution networks.
The empirical analysis in this chapter is motivated by the model of in-
ternational outsourcing developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), where
outsourcing activities by multinational firms from high skilled labor abun-
dant, developed countries contribute to a worldwide increase in the demand
for skilled labor.
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) performed a similar analysis for Mexico over
the period 1975 - 1988. Both countries, Mexico and Poland at different
points in time constituted a so-called natural experiment by opening their
markets and liberalizing economic activities. Both countries also experienced
an enormous increase in their skill premia. Feenstra and Hanson’s (1997) re-
sults suggest that it was the outsourcing by North American companies that
contributed to an increase in relative earnings of high skilled workers in Mex-
ico. Taking into account the similarities in development between Poland and
Mexico mentioned above, and the fact that the inflow of foreign investment
in Poland between 1994 and 2002 was even larger than in Mexico, I expect
to find a positive influence of FDI on relative demand for high skilled labor
8
also in Poland.1
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing
empirical literature on the influence of outsourcing on the relative demand
for skills. Section 2.3 briefly outlines Feentra and Hanson’s (1996) model
of international outsourcing. Some statistical data on FDI and a descrip-
tion of the pattern of development of wages and employment across skills in
Poland are shown, respectively, in Section 2.4 and 2.5. Section 2.6 presents
the sectoral development for foreign fixed assets, relative wages and employ-
ment of non-production workers. Section 2.7 follows with an explanation of
empirical methodology employed in the analysis. Section 2.8 describes data
and the estimation strategy along with explanatory variables. In Section 2.9
results obtained in the econometric analysis are reported. Finally, Section
2.10 concludes.
2.2 Review of the Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on wage inequality between high skilled and low
skilled workers has up to now mostly dealt with the experience of the United
States and other advanced countries. Many of these studies support the ar-
gument that skill biased technological change induces increases in the skill
premia. Bound and Johnson (1992), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)
for the United States and Berman, Bound and Machin (1997) for several
developed countries document rising relative employment of skilled work-
ers within sectors despite their rising relative wages. Complementing this,
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Krueger (1993) and Autor, Katz and
Krueger (1998) found a correlation between skill upgrading and computeri-
zation or expenditures on research and development.
Economists have also conducted a battery of tests to see if Stolper-
Samuelson logic lies behind the increase in wage inequalities. Empirically
this theorem implies that a decline in relative prices of unskilled labor in-
1Between 1994 and 2002 FDI amounted to 17 percent of gross fixed capital formation
in Poland on average, whereas Feenstra and Hanson (1997) claim 13.7 percent in 1987 in
Mexico and 7.9 percent in 1991 in China to be sufficient to have had a major impact on
recipient-country labor market.
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tensive tradable goods should induce relative wage reductions of low skilled
workers. Therefore, researchers try to gauge the effect of international trade
on the rising skill premium by examining whether product prices in unskilled
labor intensive sectors have fallen relative to prices in skilled labor inten-
sive sectors. While reviewing the relative price change literature, Chapter 3
reports conflicting evidence on whether international trade raised the rela-
tive prices in skilled labor intensive sectors and thereby contributed to the
increase in wage inequality.
More recent economic research is based on the idea that international out-
sourcing has contributed to the deteriorating situation of low skilled workers.
Considering that firms in high wage countries move the low skill intensive
activities to low wage countries in order to cut production costs and then im-
port intermediate inputs, trade should shift employment towards high skilled
workers in high income countries. Since this topic is more relevant for the
analysis in this chapter, I describe these studies in the greater detail.
Following this reasoning Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) are the first re-
searchers who analyze the influence of outsourcing on growing skilled labor
demand in the US during two periods of time: 1972 through 1979 and 1979 -
1990. Their empirical model is based on a translog cost function, from which
a cost share equation for skilled workers can be derived. This cost share
proxies the relative demand for skilled workers. Outsourcing is measured by
two variables, a share of imports in total US consumption and, more directly,
a share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy
materials.
Although the outsourcing activity expanded over the whole examined pe-
riod, the authors obtain different results for the 1970s and the 1980s. During
the later period in the US, import in general as well as import of inter-
mediaries substantially contributed to an increase in relative demand for
high-skilled labor, while for the earlier time span the result is even negative.
During the 1980s outsourcing accounted for about 30 to 50 percent of the in-
crease in the non-production workers’ wage share, which is considerably more
than the portion explained by the import penetration variable. Feenstra and
10
Hanson (1996b) conclude that the discrepancy between the results for the
two time periods might be explained by the construction of the outsourcing
measure which does not distinguish between imports from advanced and low
wage countries.
In their subsequent study, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) refine the measure
of outsourcing by focusing on imported intermediate inputs from the same
industry as a final good, what they call a narrow definition of outsourcing.2 In
this paper they find that outsourcing measured narrowly can explain about 15
percent of the observed increase in the cost share of non-production workers
in US manufacturing between 1979 and 1990.
Anderton and Brenton (1999) in their paper about the impact of out-
sourcing on the relative wages and employment of low skilled labor in the UK,
have proxied outsourcing indirectly by import share in domestic production.
They also apply the translog cost function approach. The authors disaggre-
gate the UK imports into those coming from industrialized and low wage
countries, addressing the idea mentioned by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b)
that the source of imports may be of importance. They concentrate on two
broad sectors: textiles and non-electrical machinery arguing that the former
are perceived as requiring the intensive use of unskilled labor, while the latter
is usually treated as using large inputs of skilled labor.3
Furthermore, the authors test if the degree of outsourcing differs across
industries, as one might expect that low skill intensive sectors are more prone
to outsourcing than high skill intensive ones. In contrast to Feenstra and
Hanson (1996b) for the US the authors find that in the case of the UK
(1970 - 1986) total import penetration as well as imports from industrialized
countries have no impact on relative demand for high skilled workers. Only
imports from low wage countries appear to have positive and statistically
significant influence on relative demand. Finally, in line with expectations,
non-electrical machinery - being relatively skill intensive compared to textiles
- is less exposed to outsourcing.
2This study is reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.
3Disaggregated, these industries yield eleven sectors.
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While in their paper of Anderton and Brenton (1999) focus on outsourc-
ing, but do not explicitly measure it, Hijzen, Goerg and Hine (2003) provide
a detailed study of the effects of outsourcing for the UK. Like Feenstra and
Hanson (1999) they employ narrow and broad measures of outsourcing. Im-
portantly, the authors include the 1990s in the analysis, when international
fragmentation of production became a subject of political discussion. Fur-
thermore, they labor market data allow to depart from a crude distinction
between manual and non-manual workers and define skill groups according
to occupations. In addition to outsourcing the authors include variables
measuring import penetration and technological change to the regression, in
order to account for other factors that might have shifted the production
function. They conclude, that outsourcing in the narrow sense can account
for “as much as half” of the increase in the UK wage inequality over the
period 1982 - 1997.
Finally, in a very recent paper Geishecker (2005) analyzes how interna-
tional outsourcing has affected the relative demand for manual workers in
Germany during the 1990s. Germany, as Geishecker notes, differs consider-
ably from the above studied countries, as it is more open to international
trade, than for example the US, and has a more rigid labor market than
Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, because of its geographical position, it
is extremely easy for German firms to take advantage of low wages in Central
and Eastern European countries, by undertaking outsourcing activities.
Geishecker points out, that between 1975 and 2000 continuous skill up-
grading in German manufacturing took place. In contrast, at the same time
the relative wages of low skilled workers remained quite stable. In the tradi-
tion of Feenstra and Hanson, he also constructs a narrow and wide measure
of outsourcing. Using these measures, in turn he approximates an outsourc-
ing indicator for CEE and the rest of the world. His empirical model is,
as in previously reviewed studies, based on the translog cost function. Fur-
thermore he applies the General Method of Moments (GMM) in order to
account for endogeneity of international outsourcing. Applying the narrow
concept of outsourcing and not differentiating by region, Geishecker (2005)
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finds only insignificant effects. When distinguishing between different geo-
graphical regions, outsourcing activity toward CEE significantly lowers the
wage bill share of manual workers.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the phenomenon of international outsourcing
is closely related to the notion of offshoring. Offshoring can be defined as
international outsourcing in form of vertical foreign direct investment. In
other words, offshoring differs from outsourcing by the extent of control a
firm has over the outsourcing activity. Such a form of outsourcing gained
much attention of economists since multinational enterprises (MNEs) started
to invest on a large scale in developing countries and in countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
There has been little analysis on the role of inward FDI on the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries. Blonigen
and Slaughter (2001) examine this hypothesis on the US example. As one
would expect, since the US is not generally perceived as a typical host for
outsourcing activities,, even though the presence of foreign-owned affiliates
in the US has grown more rapidly in significance for the US economy than
trade flows, the authors do not find that inward FDI has contributed to
shifts in the US relative labor demand toward skilled labor. This finding is
consistent with recent models of multinational enterprises in which foreign
affiliates focus on activities less skilled labor intensive than the activities of
their parent firms. It also suggests, that in the case of advanced countries
one should rather focus on outward FDI.
This is done by Slaughter (2000a). He analyzes whether the transfer
of production stages within US MNEs to foreign affiliates has affected the
US relative skilled labor demand. First, he finds that during the examined
period: 1977 - 1994, the foreign affiliate employment of US multinationals
actually declined. Second, the regression analysis does not confirm MNEs’
offshoring activities having impact on skill upgrading in the US manufactur-
ing.
In contrast, Head and Ries (2002) find a positive relationship between
offshore production by Japanese multinationals and domestic skill intensity.
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Their data set differ markedly from all other studies on outsourcing and
its effect on relative skilled labor demand, as they use firm level data. In
particular they find that FDI in low income countries raises skill intensity
in the home country and this effect falls as investment shifts toward high
income countries. Additionally, for high enough host country income levels,
FDI can cause downgrading at home.
While inward FDI has been found to have no effect on domestic relative
demand for skilled labor in the US, the opposite was been found by Feenstra
and Hanson (1997) for one of the low wage trading partners of the United
States, Mexico. To analyze the relative wage implications of FDI, the authors
apply their theoretical model of international outsourcing4, in which a high
skilled labor abundant country outsources its low skilled intensive activities
to an low skilled labor abundant country. For the host country, however,
these activities are high skill-intensive, since it is specialized in production of
low skilled intensive commodities compared to high skilled labor abundant
countries. That is, outsourcing by multinational companies from skilled labor
abundant countries contributes to a worldwide increase in the demand for
skilled labor. This model is an important theoretical contribution, as it is
able to explain the observed increase in wage inequality among extremely
different countries. In their paper about Mexico, the authors measure FDI
using regional data on foreign assembly plants, so called maquiladoras5. They
conclude, that in regions where FDI is concentrated, it can account for over 50
percent of the increase in the skilled labor wage share that occurred between
1975 and 1988 in Mexico.
Being a popular destination of FDI, also transition countries have at-
tracted the attention of economists. Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) in-
vestigated the contribution of FDI to the increase in earning inequality in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during the 1990s. They follow the
4This model will be outlined in the next section.
5Maquiladoras are factories, the majority of which are located in Mexican border towns,
that imports materials and equipment on a duty- and tariff-free basis for assembly or
manufacturing. These companies work under the Maquila Decree, requiring all products
to be exported from Mexico. Maquiladoras can be 100 percent foreign-owned (usually by
US companies). (Wikipedia, a free encyclopedia)
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same empirical model as all other studies in this survey, where the dependent
variable is the cost share of skilled workers in total variable cost. The authors
measure foreign capital by inward FDI stocks.
Additionally, like Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2003), they control for some
other effects associated with international trade and technological progress,
by including export and import of final good and the total business enter-
prise expenditure on R&D. The authors apply fixed effects and instrumental
variables approach, the latter to tackle the possible endogeneity of relative
wages.6 Their results suggest that FDI has no direct influence on labor de-
mand shifts in the three examined countries. However, it did contribute to
rising skill premium “through the active role played by multinational firms
in the transition induced process”. That is, MNEs have helped to push the
labor market from a compressed wage structure at the beginning of the trans-
formation process to form of wage determination that are typical for a market
economy. Regarding other results, they find negative impact of imports and
exports on the skilled labor share in accordance with the traditional factor-
proportions model.
In this chapter, I am analyzing the impact of foreign capital inflows on
increasing relative demand and skill premium of high skilled workers in Polish
manufacturing between 1994 and 2002. My study differs from the one of
Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) in three important ways. First, I am able
to measure foreign capital in a more direct way, with fixed assets instead of
inward FDI stocks. Second, I apply a more formal approach by examining
the model of international outsourcing developed by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a). Additionally, I use more disaggregated data and therefore have more
observations which is crucial for instrumental variables approach. As will be
shown, the analysis in this chapter differs from the above study concerning
results. I find strong statistical evidence for FDI having contributed to the
increase in relative high-skilled labor demand in Poland.
6This issue will be discussed in Section 2.9.2.
15
2.3 The Model of International Outsourcing
The theoretical base of the empirical research in this chapter is the interna-
tional outsourcing model developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a). This
section briefly outlines this model and its implications for relative demand
for skilled labor.
In Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) model, the world economy consists of two
countries: North and South. Each country is endowed in three production
factors: capital, high skilled labor and low-skilled labor. These endowments
are assumed to be sufficiently different so that factor prices are not equalized.
Return to capital and relative wage of high skilled labor are higher in the
South, reflecting a relative scarcity of capital and high skilled labor in the
South. Initially there is no international factor mobility, but labor mobility
between skill categories. In other words, the supply of skilled and unskilled
workers can react to changes in the relative wages.
On the production side there is a single final good assembled from a
continuous range of intermediate inputs at no additional cost. These inputs
are produced using all factors and differ only with regard to the relative
amounts of high skilled and low skilled labor engaged in their production
since capital enters the production function with the same cost share for all
inputs. They are indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] and ranked in a way that high skilled
labor intensity is increasing with z. Assuming that for constant wages the
minimum cost of producing one unit of input is a continuous function of z
and that all inputs are produced in both countries, Figure 2.1 depicts the
minimum cost locus for intermediate goods produced in the North (CNCN)
and in the South (CSCS). Inputs lying to the left of the “cutoff intermediate
input” z∗ where the minimum production cost is equal, engage less high
skilled labor in the production than inputs with a higher z index. In this
range, therefore, CSCS lies below CNCN since the relative wage of high
skilled labor is higher in the South. The opposite holds for intermediates
lying to the right of z∗. Thus, the South has a cost advantage in producing
inputs that are relatively low skilled labor intensive and the North producing
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Figure 1. Outsourcing from North to South.
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Figure 2.1: Outsourcing from he North to the South (Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a))
inputs, the production techniques of which are relatively high skill intensive.
The following trade pattern emerges: the South exports intermediate goods
in the range z ∈ [0, z∗) while the North exports those in the range z ∈ (z∗, 1].
What will happen in the model if Northern firms are allowed to invest
in the South? They will have an incentive to do so in order to earn the
higher returns to capital in the South. The flow of capital from the North
to the South will cause a reduction in the Southern return to capital and
an increase in return to capital in the North. Consequently, at constant
wages, this change will alter the minimum cost loci shown in Figure 2.1.
CSCS will move down and CNCN up increasing the critical value of z∗ to z′.
That is, the production of inputs in range [z∗, z′) will now take place in the
South rather than in the North. In other words, in the South, the range of
intermediate production will spread toward inputs that engage a higher ratio
of high skilled to low skilled labor. The inputs, that will be still produced in
the North, will use a higher ratio of high skilled to low skilled labor relative
to those that will leave.
Thus, both countries will experience an increase in the average skill in-
tensity of production and an increase in the relative demand for high skilled
labor. As a result, the relative wage of skilled labor will rise in both countries.
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This will in turn affect both cost loci in Figure 2.1, but Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a) show that even after accounting for this change in factor prices, z∗
will still rise.
Summarizing, z∗ is increasing with the Southern to Northern capital ratio.
Furthermore, the relative wage of high skilled to low skilled labor is deter-
mined by z∗ since its “location” affects relative labor demand. Thus, the
relative wage of skilled workers will be positively affected by accumulation
of capital in the South relative to the North. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a)
show that this result also holds for exogenous relative capital accumulation
in the South not necessarily caused by Northern firms’ investment.
Following Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) model, the capital flow from the
North to the South can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of out-
sourcing activities. That is, the activities that are outsourced by industrial
countries to developing countries are relatively low skilled from the perspec-
tive of the home country and relatively high skilled for the host country.
Thus, outsourcing increases the relative demand for high skilled workers in
both countries resulting in a higher relative wage for high skilled labor.
2.4 FDI in Poland
“Few countries have taken better advantage of the new possibilities of en-
gaging with the globalized world than Poland” - states the new report of In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO) World Commission (2004). Indeed,
in the course of the 1990s, the role of foreign activities in Poland was grad-
ually increasing. In the first years of transition, foreign investors preferred
to establish their activities in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Starting
from the mid 1990s, however, Poland became the major recipient of FDIs in
the region, at least in absolute terms. The acceleration of FDI by the mid
1990s was partly supported by liberalization of capital movements as part
of Poland’s accession process to OECD in 1996 and EU in 2004, and partly
by progress in large scale privatization schemes with involvement of foreign
strategic investors. After 2000, due to continuing sluggishness of the global
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economy, flows of FDIs worldwide cooled down considerably.7 In Poland the
inflow declined by 33 percent in 2001 compared to 41 percent worldwide.
Nevertheless, already in 2002, despite the negative global trends and previ-
ous UNCTAD forecasts, the inflow of FDIs to CEE countries amounted to
USD 29 billion i.e. 15 percent more than in the previous year.8 It was the
only region in the world that experienced an increase of the inflow of FDIs.
The recovery of foreign investment in Poland came one year later. According
to Josef Ackerman, the president of Deutsche Bank, the new wave of FDI is
on the way: “The new Union is being discovered by investors. You are going
to observe a steady growth of capital in Poland”.9
2.4.1 The Role of FDI in the Polish Economy
Between 1990 and 1995 the average FDI inflow amounted to USD 1.33 billion
per year compared to USD 7.45 billion between 1996 and 2002. Since then, as
it can be seen from Table 2.1, foreign capital has became a very important
source of funds in Poland. While in 1994 FDI stock accounted for 4.36
percent of GDP, in 2002 it reached 34 percent. Its share in gross fixed
capital formation increased from 8.39 percent in 1994 to 16.68 percent in
2002, reaching a peak value of 27.03 percent in 2000.
Table 2.2 presents the structure of FDI in Poland according to the country
of origin and sectoral distribution. By the end of 2002, nearly 70 percent of
FDI originated from the EU member states led by France whose investments
in Poland amounted to USD 12.2 billion (18.7 percent of total FDI stock),
followed by the United States, with USD 8.7 billion (13.4 percent of total).
Although in terms of investment volume Germany ranked only third with
USD 7.8 billion (12 percent of total), considering the number of firms in
2002 it claimed the first place. Among 993 foreign firms with investments
exceeding 1 million USD registered in Poland, as many as 231 were German.
128 American companies constituted the next strong group, followed by 93
French firms.
7UNCTAD (2002)
8PAIiIZ
9Rzeczpospolita, 6. October 2004.
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Table 2.1: Foreign Direct Investment in Poland
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
inflowsa 89 678 1491 5197 9574 10601 6064
stocka 120 1605 4321 12028 30651 49392 65087
% of GDPb 0.20 1.90 4.36 8.36 19.24 29.65 34.00
% of GFCFcd 0.72 4.79 8.39 17.43 23.90 27.03 16.68
a In USD million.
b FDI stock.
c FDI inflow.
d GFCF - Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
Source: Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The biggest part of foreign capital has been absorbed by the manufactur-
ing industry (40 percent) even though its share declined in favor of services
at the end of the last decade.10 In 2002 the share of foreign firms in sales in
manufacturing reached 41 percent and about 44 percent of fixed assets were
in foreign hands. Transportation equipment and food processing attracted
nearly half of the capital invested in the manufacturing industry. The other
non-metallic mineral products sector received almost 14 percent, chemicals
and chemical products - 8 percent. In services, the largest recipient of FDI
was the financial sector, with 22 percent of total cumulated FDI, followed by
trade and repairs - 12 percent.
While the strategy of foreign investors initially focused on serving the
domestic market, the largest consumer pool in Central and Eastern Europe,
they have turned increasingly to foreign markets. In 2002, they generated
59 percent of total exports and 56 percent of total imports compared to 38
and 47 percent respectively in 1996.11 Their share was even higher for some
groups of commodities, like the automotive industry, where foreign firms
accounted for 97 percent of exports.
10By the end of 1998, the manufacturing accounted for 62.4 percent of capital invested
in Poland.
11Foreign Trade Research Institute
20
Table 2.2: Structure of Foreign Direct Investment Stocka (end of 2002)
by sector by country of origin
manufacturing 40.28 European Union 71.62
of which: of which:
transportation equipment 25.13 France 27.66
food processing 24.17 Germany 17.82
other non-metallic products 13.67 Netherlands 13.28
chemical products 7.78 UK 9.21
pulp and paper 6.98 Italy 8.40
electrical machinery 6.78 Sweden 6.34
wood 5.41 Denmark 4.18
rubber and plastic 2.62 Belgium 3.74
metal and metal products 2.21 Ireland 2.41
machinery and equipment 2.12 Cyprus 2.27
other 3.13 Austria 1.81
financial intermediation 21.80 Spain 1.35
trade and repairs 12.35 Greece 1.27
transport and storage 10.17 USA 14.22
construction 5.33 South Korea 3.33
power, gas and water 3.70 Russia 2.15
community, social and personal services 2.97 Switzerland 1.52
real estate and business activities 1.91 Japan 0.57
other 1.49 other 6.59
a In percent of total investment exceeding USD 1 million.
Source: Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ).
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Accounting for 9.4 percent12 of total employment, foreign firms have not
only largely contributed to the restructuring and modernization of the econ-
omy by bringing in capital, expertise and management know-how, but they
have also had a major impact on the Polish labor market, as will be shown
in this chapter.
2.5 Skills, Wages and Employment in Poland
Prior to 1989, wage distribution across skills in Poland was very compressed
due to “central planner’s” preference toward equalization. In 1988, non-
production workers’ earnings in manufacturing were actually equal to earn-
ings of production workers. Only fourteen years later, in 2002, they earned
twice as much.13
Table 2.3: Wages and Composition of Employment According to Educational
Levels in Poland a
wage relative share in total
to average wage employment
educational level 1996 2001 1996 2001
tertiary 144.0 149.0 11.6 15.6
post-secondary 99.0 94.0 28.2 29.8
secondary 99.0 98.0 6.0 6.8
basic vocational 89.0 79.0 34.0 33.9
primary and incomplete primary 83.0 73.0 20.2 13.9
a In percent.
Source: Polish Statistical Office (Rocznik Statystyczny Pracy).
Table 2.3 reports wages of persons with different educational levels rel-
ative to average wage and composition of total employment according to
distinct educational levels. Whereas earnings of persons with tertiary edu-
cation have grown slightly more than the average, low skilled persons saw
12Share of employment in firms with foreign participation in total employment in 2002.
13In common with most studies on this issue, I am forced to measure skills with the
nature of the work activity, since data on wages according to occupation and educational
level were not published before 1996. Even after 1996, they were not available at the
disaggregation level necessary for my econometric analysis.
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their wages declining considerably relative to the average wage. At the same
time, we observed a substantial growth of skilled workers’ participation in
total employment. Between 1996 and 2001, when the total employment de-
clined by about 7 percent, the number of employed persons with university
degree increased by about 26 percent. In contrast, persons with primary and
incomplete primary education faced a 36 percent decline in the number of
jobs offered. The fact, that the only group that experienced an increase of
wage relative to average wage are university graduates underlines the growing
importance of skills in the Polish labor market.
2.5.1 Wages and Employment in Manufacturing
The deteriorating situation of low skilled workers is even more conspicuous in
the manufacturing sector. Figure 2.2 plots the evolution of real wages in the
manufacturing sector since 1990. The top line represents the non-production
workers’ wage, while the bottom line the production workers’ wage. The
line in between depicts the manufacturing average wage. This graph has
three striking features. First, the non-production workers’ wages increased
stronger than average and production workers’ wages throughout the whole
examined period.
Second, after 1999 we observe that the growth rate of all types of wages
decreased. And finally, since 1999 only skilled workers’ wage was increas-
ing, while the growth of average wage in manufacturing had stagnated and
unskilled workers started even to lose in real terms. Figure 2.3 shows that
in 1990 the relative wage of high-skilled workers in manufacturing amounted
to 1.24 and in 2002 already 2.03. That is, it increased by 4.1 percent per
year on average. In order to assess the economic size of this increase one can
compare it with the growth of wage inequality in the United States between
1979 and 1990 which increased by “only” 0.72 percent on average per year,
and was called “dramatic” by several economists.
As the next figure shows, the increase in relative wages was accompa-
nied by an increase in relative demand for skilled workers. Both the non-
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Figure 2.2: The Evolution of Real Wages in Polish Manufacturing (in PLN,
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Workers’ Wage Share in Polish Manufacturing
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production workers’ wage share in the total wage bill14 and the relative em-
ployment of high skilled workers have been increasing between 1990 and
2002, even though the growth of the relative employment was not so sharp
and stable as the growth of the relative wages. Still, the relative employment
of non-production workers in manufacturing increased by 0.92 percent on
average per year.
2.6 Foreign Fixed Assets and the Labor
Market
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 the aggregate development of FDI and relative wages
and employment of non-production workers in Poland have been presented.
In the anticipation of the econometric analysis it is useful to look at the
variation of the variables at a disaggregated level. Figure 2.4 ranks the 23
NACE manufacturing sectors, that constitute the cross section in the panel
used for econometric analysis, according to their changes in the extent of
offshoring activities, measured by the share of foreign fixed assets in domestic
fixed assets.
In the period examined (1994 - 2002), in all sectors but one: wearing ap-
parel, multinationals increased outsourcing. The observed increase of foreign
capital was the highest in two sectors: motor vehicles and tobacco. Figure 2.4
presents also the sectoral variation of changes in relative wages and employ-
ment of non-production workers. In general, these graphs suggest that an
enhanced offshoring activity corresponds to a increasing wage gap between
non-production and production workers, while the positive relationship be-
tween offshoring and relative employment of these workers is slightly less
pronounced. The next part of this chapter provides an econometric analysis
of these relationships.
14Because the increase in relative wage of non-production workers might induce sub-
stitution away from non-production labor and therefore the relative employment of non-
production workers would probably underrepresent the shift in the demand toward skilled
labor, Figure 2.3 contains also an alternative measure of changes in demand: the non-
production labor wage share in the total wage bill.
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Figure 2.4: Foreign Fixed Assets, Relative Wages and Relative Employment
of Non-Production Workers in Manufacturing Sectors in Poland
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2.7 Empirical Model
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on a translog variable cost
function approach, introduced by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). This
methodology is employed widely by the empirical literature investigating the
effects of international outsourcing on the wage gap between high skilled and
low skilled workers.
In the model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) outlined in Section 2.3
countries are endowed with three factors of production: high skilled labor,
low skilled labor and capital. In the production process these factors are
combined, which leads to the following cost function for each sector i:
CVi = C(w
HS
i , w
LS
i , Ki, Yi) (2.1)
where wHSi and w
LS
i are wages paid for high skilled and low skilled labor,
respectively, Ki is the capital stock and Yi - output. The capital is assumed
to be a fixed factor in the short run while both types of labor are to be treated
as variable factors. This cost function can be approximated by a translog
function:
lnCVi = β0 + βHSlnw
HS
i + βLSlnw
LS
i + βK lnKi + βY lnYi
+
1
2
βHSLSlnw
HS
i lnw
LS
i +
1
2
βLSHSlnw
LS
i lnw
HS
i
+
1
2
βHSHSlnw
HS
i lnw
HS
i +
1
2
βLSLSlnw
LS
i lnw
LS
i
+
1
2
βY Y lnYi +
1
2
βKK lnKi + βKHSlnKilnw
HS
i
+ βKLSlnKilnw
LS
i + βY HSlnYilnw
HS
i
+ βY LSlnYilnw
LS
i + βKY lnKilnYi (2.2)
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By applying Shepard’s Lemma15 to (2.2) I obtain:
WBSHSi = βHS +
1
2
βHSLSlnw
LS
i +
1
2
βLSHSlnw
LS
i + βHSHSlnw
HS
i
+ βKHSlnKi + βY HSlnYi (2.3)
(2.3) presents the high skilled labor demand equation in the form of its share
in the total variable cost. Since the two types of labor are the only variable
factors, WBSHSi is defined as the high skilled workers’ wage bill in the total
wage bill. Imposing the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions on the cost
function, the equation (2.3) can be further simplified16:
WBSHSi = βHS + +βHSHSln(
wHSit
wLSit
) + βKHSlnKi + βY HSlnYi (2.4)
Adding a time dimension and a stochastic error term εi and disaggregat-
ing the capital stock (Ki) into domestic capital (K
D
i ) and foreign capital
(KFDIi )
17 yields the following estimating equation:
WBSHSit = β0 + β1ln(
wHSit
wLSit
) + β3ln(1 +
KFDIit
KDit
)
+ β3lnK
D
i + β4lnYi + εit (2.5)
The dependent variable in this equation is a composite measure, as it in-
corporates relative wages of non-production workers as well as their relative
employment.
15Shepard’s Lemma provides the link between the variable cost function parameters and
factor demands. The lemma states, that the cost-minimizing demand for factor input HS
(high skilled labor) is such that LHS = ∂C
V
∂wHS
where LHS is defined as the number of high
skilled workers. Noting that: ∂lnC
V
∂lnwHS
= w
HS
CV
× ∂C
V
∂wHS
, the lemma can also be written as
stating that the logarithmic partial derivative of variable cost function equals the factor
share: ∂lnC
V
∂lnwHS
= w
HSLHS
CV
.
16In order to impose symmetry and homogeneity on the cost function following param-
eter restrictions are required: βHSLS = βLSHS , for symmetry and βHSHS + βHSLS = 0,
for homogeneity.
17ln(KDi + K
FDI
i ) = ln(K
D
i ) + ln(1 +
KF DIi
KDi
)
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2.8 Data, Explanatory Variables and Estima-
tion Strategy
2.8.1 Data and Explanatory Variables
I study the influence of international outsourcing, measured by foreign capital
accumulation, on the relative demand for skills in Poland in the manufactur-
ing industry in Poland. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel18 of 23
NACE (2-digit) industries over a 9 years’ period (1994-2002).19
The dependent variable, relative demand for high skilled workers, is prox-
ied by the high skilled labor wage share, measured as the non-production
workers’ wage share in the total wage bill. One component of the dependent
variable, the employment of high skilled (low skilled) workers, is measured
by annual average employment of non-production (production) workers. The
second component, the wage of high skilled (low skilled) workers is measured
by an annual average gross wage of non-production (production) workers.
Unfortunately, especially at the level of disaggregation necessary for econo-
metric analysis, no better proxies for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are
available.
The data set obtained from Polish Statistical Office (PSO)20 allows for
direct measurement of foreign capital and also enables separation of foreign
and domestic owned fixed assets.21 However, I cannot distinguish foreign
affiliates that explicitly engage in outsourcing, or more precisely offshoring22,
from other foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, I treat all foreign firms as off-
shoring firms, even if the latter actually constitute only a subset in my data
18Some numbers are not made public for confidentiality reasons.
19As mentioned in Section 2.2 Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) examine a similar ques-
tion for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, they have data on 6 ISIC
industries and in the case of Poland they cover the period 1994 to 2001.
20Data has been partly collected from various publications of PSO and partly obtained
from PSO in electronic form. For details see Appendix.
21Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for lack of data could not directly measure the capital
stock in foreign ownership and thus used the number of foreign firms as a proxy. Bruno,
Crino and Falzoni (2004) measure foreign capital with foreign direct investment stock.
22As previously noted, offshoring can be defined as international outsourcing of activities
within the boundaries of multinational firm in the form of vertical FDI.
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set. (1 +
KFDIi
KDi
) and KD representing the ratio of foreign to domestic capital
and domestic capital, respectively, compose my basic specification.
In addition to the basic variables I include several control variables. Feen-
stra and Hanson (2001) argue that one should include any structural variables
that capture other factors that might influence the production costs. In or-
der to account for the restructuring processes in Polish manufacturing I use
a measure of privatization (the share of private firms in the total number of
firms). I assume that private enterprises have stronger incentives to ratio-
nalize and modernize their production than their public counterparts so that
their activities might have affected the relative high skilled labor demand.
Furthermore, it is necessary to include variables that, following theoretical
and empirical literature, could also have an impact on relative demand for
high skilled labor. For this purpose I include the share of R&D expenditures
in sales in order to account for technological improvement, and import and
export penetration ratios to control for potential influence of international
integration and of exposure to international competition.
It is common practice to include output in this type of the regression, as
the variable cost function condition on total output. However, due to high
correlation between output (measured by sales) and domestic fixed assets,
which enter the regression in levels, I excluded the output variable from
regression. Thus my modified estimating equation is:
WBSHSit = β1 + β4ln(
wHSit
wLSit
) + β2ln(1 +
KFDIit
KDit
) + β3lnK
D
it
+ β5lnPRIV FIRM/FIRMit + β6lnR&D/Yit
+ β7lnIMP/Yit + β8lnEXP/Yit + εit (2.6)
where PRIV FIRM/FIRM denotes the share of private firms in the total
number of firms, R&D/Y is defined as the R&D expenditures over sales,
IMP/Y represents import share in sales and EXP/Y - export share in
sales.
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2.8.2 Estimation Strategy
The above regression will be estimated with fixed effects, since any variation
between units not accounted for by the independent variables creates unob-
served heterogeneity in the model. Given that industries differ from each
other in terms of size or skilled labor and capital intensities, estimating with
OLS would relegate the unobserved heterogeneity to the error term and the
coefficients would be biased.23
Furthermore, I also incorporate time fixed effects. There are two impor-
tant reasons for doing so. First, I have neglected the fact, that foreign capital
might be determined by some foreign factors. Due to obvious reasons I can-
not include these variables in the regression. By inclusion of time dummies, I
assume that the impact of foreign variables is the same across industries and
varies only over time. Second, one should not forget that Poland is a tran-
sition economy with institutions and the economic system as a whole being
still “work in progress”. Hence, there might exist some aggregate exogenous
factors that are correlated with the industry-level relative labor demand.
Accounting for industry and time fixed effects helps also to resolve potential
problems arising from omitting output in the regression.
Not surprisingly, statistical tests show that there is a heteroscedasticity
problem plaguing our data. In order to assure the efficiency of diagnostic tests
all standard errors reported in the results are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Finally, the relative wages of high skilled workers are likely to be endogenous
in the wage share regression, and failure to control for this may lead to
simultaneity bias. I am avoiding this problem by excluding the relative wages
variable while estimating with OLS. This in turn may cause omitted variable
bias. It is therefore necessary to verify the robustness of the OLS estimates
by instrumental variables method.
23The big advantage of the fixed effects versus random effects is that any potential
correlation of the explanatory variables with the individual effects is rendered harmless
since the fixed effects and therefore their correlation with the explanatory variables are
annihilated. Additionally, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the estimates
from the two models are the same, that is, the random effects estimator is not a viable
solution and fixed effects should be more efficient (Beck and Katz (1995)).
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2.9 Results of Estimation
2.9.1 Fixed Effects Estimates
Table 2.4 reports the fixed effects estimation results for the wage share of high
skilled labor. Column (1) presents the basic specification with the two inde-
pendent variables: foreign (1 + K
FDI
KD
) and domestic capital (KD). Columns
(2) to (4) present the results when adding several control variables to the
basic specification. The coefficient on the foreign capital variable is positive
and statistically significant in all regressions, in line with the prediction of
the theoretical model outlined in Section 2.3. Its magnitude ranges from
0.029 to 0.044, but what is actually interesting is its economic significance.
The number obtained by multiplying the most conservative estimate of the
coefficient of the foreign fixed assets (0.029) by the average growth of the
share of foreign fixed assets between 1994 and 2002 (116.5 percent) is the
contribution of foreign capital to changes in relative demand for skills. It
implies that FDI can account for at least 34 percent of the observed increase
in non-production workers’ wage share (0.099) in the Polish manufacturing
sector between 1994 and 2002.
The coefficient of domestic capital is also positive in all specifications but
not statistically significant. The sign of domestic capital coefficient corrobo-
rates the theoretical result, that any accumulation of capital, be it domestic
or foreign owned, leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labor. Its statistical insignificance, however, underlines the special role of
foreign capital for the changes in relative high skilled labor demand.
The inclusion of control variables does not change the results obtained
for the basic regressors. PRIV FIRM/FIRM has a positive and significant
impact on the high skilled wage share. The result on the R&D/Y variable
suggests that the increase in the relative high skilled labor demand was partly
due to technological upgrading. The negative coefficient on the import share
can be seen from the Heckscher-Ohlin perspective. Given that Poland is low
skilled labor abundant compared to its trading partners, international trade
would exert a downward pressure on earnings of high skilled workers relative
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to the earnings of low skilled workers. Nevertheless, the result on the export
share is inconclusive. Finally, as argued in Section 2.8.2 the inclusion of
time dummies is crucial when analyzing the role of outsourcing for relative
demand for skilled workers in Poland. The positive coefficients of the year
dummies suggest that the transition to market economy, has favored high
skilled workers.
In the remaining specifications of Table 2.4 I substitute (1 + K
FDI
KD
) with
the ratio of the number of foreign to domestic firms (1 + E
FDI
ED
), as a first
robustness check. Inspection of columns (5) to (8) shows that the results are
robust to this alternative measure of outsourcing.
In Table 2.5 I replace the wage share of high-skilled workers as depen-
dent variable by decomposing it into relative employment and wages of non-
production workers and estimate similar regressions as in columns (1) to (4)
of Table 2.4. As can be seen, the results for the relative employment, reported
in the first four columns, practically mirror those for the wage share. Only
the magnitude of the coefficients is twice as high (in the case of R&D/Y
even triple) and the year dummies lose their significance. The regressions
with high-skilled workers’ relative wages in columns (5) to (8) give a dif-
ferent picture. The coefficients on domestic capital become significant at
one-percent level, while the influence of privatization becomes negative and
not significant. R&D/Y retains its positive sign but it is no more significant,
whereas the year dummies are positive and highly significant.
The different results on the time dummies are not surprising. Under
the socialist regime Poland had an extremely compressed wage distribution.
Thus, one of the dimensions of the transition process was the liberalization of
wage setting schemes. In the regression with relative wages, significant and
positive time dummies may reflect the general, sector invariant, labor market
adjustments to a market economy. Simultaneously, the relative employment
underwent changes that were rather sector specific and therefore, better cap-
tured by industry specific measures. Summarizing, the main message of this
table is the positive and significant impact of foreign capital (1 + K
FDI
KD
) on
relative wages and its positive although less statistically significant impact
35
on relative employment of non-production workers.
2.9.2 Robustness
So far I have neglected the potential influence of relative wages of high skilled
workers. Such an approach, as argued above, may however cause omitted
variable bias. In order to address this problem, in this section the relative
wages are included in the regression. Since the inclusion of relative wages
might in turn cause endogeneity bias we reestimate the above regressions
with instrumental variables (IV) method. In addition to other right hand side
variables I include the second and third lags of relative wages as instruments.
It is also likely that foreign capital is endogenous. Bruno, Crino and
Falzoni (2004) and Pavcnik (2003) argue that foreign firms invest in some
industries because of their high skill intensity not the other way round. Tests
for exogeneity, indeed, indicated that both relative wages and foreign capital
variables are endogenous. Therefore, I also added first, second and third
lags of the foreign capital variable to the existing set of instruments. For
the purpose of controlling for heteroscedasticity, I apply General Method of
Moments (GMM) estimates.
Table 2.6 shows IV-GMM estimates for high skilled workers’ wage share.
It appears that the coefficients on foreign capital remain positive, roughly of
the same value and statistically significant. The inclusion of relative wages,
however, deprived privatization and year dummies of their explanatory power
with the PRIV FIRM/FIRM coefficient becoming even even negative. The
year dummies were actually excluded from the regression, since their presence
led to rejection of the joint hypothesis of correct model specification and
orthogonality conditions. This confirms the above result that the transition
process is partly responsible for the increase in non-production workers’ wage
bill share, because it liberalized the wage setting mechanism.
Turning to Table 2.7 reporting IV-GMM results for relative employment
and wage, the inclusion of relative wages to the regression has similar conse-
quences for relative employment as for relative demand with one major differ-
ence. Increasing relative wages have slightly (statistically insignificantly) re-
36
Table 2.6: Foreign Investors and Demand for High-Skilled Labor (GMM)
dependent variable: wage bill share of high skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (1 + K
F DI
KD
) 0.040* 0.038* 0.035* 0.031*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015)
ln W
S
W US
0.199** 0.191** 0.223*** 0.246**
(0.084) (0.091) (0.079) (0.096)
ln KD 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
ln PRIV FIRM/FIRM −0.007 −0.011 −0.006
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
ln R&D/Y 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
ln IMP/Y −0.020*
(0.010)
ln EXP/Y −0.002
(0.009)
year dummies no no no no
constant 0.059 0.336 −0.031 −0.027
(0.265) (0.204) (0.269) (0.251)
Centered R2 0.961 0.958 0.958 0.958
Hansen J statistic 2.424 2.716 2.047 1.769
P − value [0.489] [0.437] [0.562] [0.621]
N 124 126 120 110
Notes: Parameters are estimated by instrumental variable regressions (GMM);
Instruments: 1st, 2nd and 3rd lag of log foreign fixed assets share in domestic
fixed assets and 2nd and 3rd lag of log relative wage; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5,
10) percent level; all regressions include industry dummies; standard errors robust
to heteroscedasticity in parentheses; N - number of observations; for expositional
ease coefficient estimates for industry dummies are not shown.
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tarded the increase of relative employment of non-production workers. Their
development in turn, was driven mainly by foreign capital and aggregate
shocks related to the transition process.
I have also carried out a regression with all independent variables lagged
one period, as Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) did in order to compare their
results with mine. The results for the two approaches differ in the value
of coefficients of the foreign capital variable. They are higher when using
lags. I also reestimated my regressions with panel-corrected standard error
estimation (PCSE), which allows correction for contemporaneous correlation
across cross-sectional units and for autocorrelation. The results are similar
to those presented in this chapter.
2.10 Conclusions
During the last decade in Poland, as in many high income countries before,
skilled workers enjoyed a substantial increase of their earnings compared to
less skilled workers’ wages. This development stands in contrast to what
trade theory predicts since according to the factor-proportions theory, inter-
national trade between a low skill abundant country and high skill abundant
country should favor low skilled workers in the former and high skilled work-
ers in the latter country.
However, the observed pattern is in accordance with the implications of
the model of international outsourcing developed by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a). As stated by this model, the activities outsourced by developed
countries are relatively low skilled for the home country and relatively high
skilled for the host country leading to an increase of relative demand for
skilled workers in both countries. Indeed, the increase of wage inequality
between skills in Poland was accompanied by an enormous inflow of foreign
capital into the country.
In this chapter, I analyzed the relationship between inward FDI and the
increasing demand for high skilled workers in Poland. The empirical anal-
ysis shows that offshoring activities undertaken by MNEs are an important
explanatory factor for the observed increase in relative demand for non-
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production workers in the Polish manufacturing. Controlling for demand
effects of privatization, technological change and international trade, time
and industry fixed effects, FDI is found to have raised the non-production
workers’ wage bill share by 34 percent between 1994 and 2002. Accounting
for endogeneity of foreign investment and relative wages by applying GMM
techniques yields similar results.
In addition to FDI, as expected, the transition process to market economy
has contributed substantially to the increase in high skilled workers’ wages by
freeing wage determination mechanisms and thus allowing for labor market
adjustments. Furthermore, the analysis shows a negative influence of import
penetration on the relative demand for high skilled workers which corrob-
orates the predictions of the neoclassical trade theory. Finally, the R&D
expenditures measuring technological change are positively correlated with
non-production workers’ wage bill share confirming the idea that technologi-
cal change favors high skilled workers. The results concerning the influence of
trade and technology are however not stable when analyzing relative wages.
A more formal approach to investigation of the impact of technology and
international trade on the skill premium in Poland is presented in the next
chapter.
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2.11 Appendix
Table 2.8: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ PSO, Rocznik Statystyczny
wage bill in total wage bill Polski, various years
relativewages non-production workers’ wages PSO, Rocznik Statystyczny
relative to production workers’ wages Polski, various years
relative number of non-production workers PSO, Rocznik Statystyczny
employment relative to production workers Polski, various years
(1 + K
F DI
KD
) one plus the ratio of foreign-owned PSO, data obtained
fixed assets to domestic fixed assets in the electronic form
(1 + E
F DI
ED
) one plus the ratio of number of foreign firms PSO, data obtained
to domestic firms in the electronic form
KD domestic fixed assets PSO, data obtained
in the electronic form
PRIV FIRM/FIRM share of private firms PSO, Rocznik Statystyczny
in total number of firms Przemys lu, various years
R&D/Y share of R&D expenditures PSO, Nauka
in sales i Technika, various years
IMP/Y share of imports in sales OECD, STAN database
EXP/Y share of exports in sales OECD, STAN database
PSO - Polish Statistical Office
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
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Chapter 3
Technology and Trade:
Predicted Wage Inequality
Changes in Poland
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that, repeating the experience of high-
income developed countries, Poland and other transition economies witnessed
a sharp increase in the inequality of wages between skilled and unskilled
workers after the fall of the socialist regime. Chapter 2 analyzed one of the
possible causes proposed in the theoretical literature, international invest-
ment activity. The main finding of this chapter was that direct investment
of foreign firms in Poland, as predicted by the theoretical model of Feenstra
and Hanson (1997), have contributed significantly to the widening of the gap
between skilled and unskilled workers’ earnings.
This chapter shifts the focus from outsourcing to other prominent expla-
nations for the change in wage inequality: international trade and techni-
cal change. In the previous chapter it was stressed, that during the 1990s
Poland not only received a huge influx of FDI, but also experienced strong
and sustained growth of imports and exports. The share of imports in GDP
rose sharply in the 1990s, from 25 percent in 1991 to around 33 percent in
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2003. Exports also grew, but at a slower rate than imports. Furthermore,
the pattern of trade significantly evolved following the disintegration of the
COMECON market. The European Union has become Poland’s main trad-
ing partner, accounting for two thirds of its imports and exports.
In the case of developed countries, the debate on the role of international
trade in general, and import from low-wage countries in particular, is not
new. In the US and UK, relative wages of low-skilled workers fell dramati-
cally during the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time the trade composition
of developed countries with newly industrialized economies (NIE) started to
change. NIEs began to export not only raw materials and agricultural prod-
ucts, but also manufacturing goods. For many economists the conclusion
was straightforward: they have interpreted the observed wage changes in de-
veloped countries as a movement toward factor price equalization. That is,
trade between developed countries that are well endowed in skilled labor and
unskilled labor abundant developing countries was rising the wages of high
skilled workers and lowering the earnings of low skilled workers in developed
countries, as the factor-proportions model predicts.
Most empirical studies, however, attributed only a minor role to the in-
ternational trade, and argued that the main driving force lies somewhere
else. This skepticism was partly due to the lack of evidence of a reduction in
wage inequality in less-developed countries. Moreover, the factor-proportions
model says that international trade affects the income distribution via a
change in relative prices of goods. So if international trade was the main
cause of the increasing wage gap, we should observe a rise in the prices of
skill-intensive products compared to those of unskilled labor-intensive goods.
Studies on international price data, however, failed to find clear evidence of
such a change in relative prices.
In terms of the traditional textbook factor-proportions model, the change
of geographical trade orientation in Poland should rather diminish the wage
inequality because for more than ten years Poland has mostly traded with
countries that are relatively better endowed with human capital. Therefore,
I expect that, like many empirical studies on developed countries, technical
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change will prove to be the main driving force behind the increase in relative
wages of skilled workers in Poland.
This chapter provides an econometric assessment of the influence of inter-
national trade and technological change on the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers. For this purpose, an approach is used that links product
prices, productivity changes and factor prices through zero-profit conditions.
In the first step, the contributions of international trade and technology im-
provements to product prices and total factor productivity are estimated.
In the second step it is analyzed to what extent these contributions have
influenced the wage changes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which is the theoretical base for the empirical
analysis in this chapter and shows the relative skilled labor demand schedule
in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. In Section 3.3 an empirical model based
on zero-profit conditions is derived. Section 3.4 provides an overview of
the empirical literature concentrated around the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
and demonstrates the evolution of the zero-profit conditions methodology. In
Section 3.6 the estimation equations are discussed and a description of the
variables is provided. Section 3.7 presents the estimation results. Finally,
Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
The first step in the reasoning is to clarify the circumstances under which
international trade can influence wages. The theoretical framework guiding
the empirical analysis in this chapter is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which
was originally derived to analyze the effects of a tariff on factor prices in the
context of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Stolper and Samuelson (1941)). More
generally, however, this theorem tells us the effects on factor prices of any
change in the prices of final goods, regardless of the reason. Therefore, as
argued in the introduction, it is an important task for the empirical part to
scrutinize the influence of international trade on domestic prices.
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The Stolper-Samuelson theorem in its original setting (two factors and
two sectors) can be explained intuitively as follows. Suppose that there are
two sectors in a country, one produces machinery, the other one food. Both
sectors exhibit constant returns to scale. Furthermore, we assume we have
only two factors of production which are fully mobile between sectors: skilled
and unskilled labor. The machinery sector is relatively skilled labor intensive,
that is it employs a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor than the food
sector for any factor prices, i.e. there are no factor intensity reversals. What
will be the effect of a tariff or some other change that increases the relative
price of the machinery sector’s output in such a setup?
Clearly, it will stimulate the expansion of production in this sector. Given
the economy is at or close to full employment of both factors, this increase
has to come at the expense of the food sector. The combined expansion of
the relatively skilled labor intensive sector and contraction of the relatively
unskilled labor intensive sector raises the aggregate demand for skilled labor
relative to unskilled labor, and so exerts an upward pressure on the skilled
wage. Because skilled labor becomes more expensive, the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers falls in both sectors. Therefore the marginal product of
skilled labor increases in terms of both goods, and therefore also the real
wage of skilled workers rises in terms of both goods. The reverse is true for
unskilled labor. All in all, the skilled workers gain and unskilled workers lose,
regardless of which goods they consume.
The implications of this theorem are disturbing for skill-rich countries.
While the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that free trade between high
skilled labor abundant countries and low skilled labor abundant countries
would increase aggregate efficiency so that national wealth will grow for both
countries, in the high skilled labor abundant countries this would be at the
expense of falling low skilled wages and increasing inequality.
Furthermore, as Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) point out, if factor prices
under free trade are set on world markets, then skilled and unskilled workers’
wages in a small open economy will be, at least to some extent, insensitive to
changes in relative factor endowments. This implication, called the Factor In-
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sensitivity Theorem, is a necessary condition for the zero profit approach. In
order to illustrate this argument, an economy-wide relative demand schedule
needs to be derived.
3.2.1 Relative Labor Demand Schedule in Heckscher-
Ohlin Model
Building on the previous example, when the machinery price increases rela-
tive to price of food, profit-seeking firms will move their production to mar-
kets that temporarily have a higher price. Therefore, as mentioned before, the
output of the machinery sector expands and the relative demand for skilled
labor increases. Since the model assumes the existence of perfect compe-
tition, which results in zero profits in equilibrium, at fixed factor supplies
relative wages have to adjust to restore equilibrium.
Hence, the zero-profit conditions linking product prices to domestic factor
prices take the following form:
pj =
∑
i∈I
aijwi (3.1)
where pj is the price in sector j (machinery or food), wi is the unit cost of the
production factor i (unskilled and skilled labor), aij is the i factor requirement
per unit of output of sector j.1 For a small open economy pj is not only a
domestic but also a world price. Furthermore, since we assume that there is
perfect mobility of factors between sectors, wi are not indexed by sector j.
If the economy is not fully specialized, that is produces both goods, then we
have two zero profit conditions (applying to each sector) with two unknowns:
skilled and unskilled workers’ wages. Therefore, wages (wi) are completely
determined by the prices (pj) and technology (aij). In other words, wages are
insensitive to factor supply changes. However, if the economy specializes in
production of only one good, we only have one zero profit condition with two
unknowns, which implies that relative wages depend also on relative factor
supply.
1aij is optimally chosen by profit-maximizing/cost-minimizing firms (assuming Cobb-
Douglas production function).
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Figure 3.1 shows the relative high skilled labor demand schedule for the
two goods, two factors model outlined above, where machinery is skilled labor
intensive (M) compared to food (F). w
HS
wLS
is defined as the relative wage of
high skilled workers, while E(HS
LS
) denotes their relative endowment. The
relative labor demand lines slope down, reflecting factor substitution within
both industries. Consider the blue solid line, where the relative supply of
skilled workers is very low. Below E∗ country will only produce food. For
food production, a relatively high number of unskilled workers is used and
the relatively scarce skilled labor earns high wages.
Moving slightly to the right (so that we remain to the left of E∗) will
increase the output of the food sector which will employ a higher ratio of
skilled to unskilled workers than before and decrease the relative wages of
skilled workers in order to maintain their employment. However, the relative
wage of skilled workers will still be too high to make machinery production
profitable (to the left of E∗ profits in this sector are negative).
Machinery will not be produced until relative endowments are such as
between E∗ and E∗∗. Within this range both goods will be produced and so
there will be only room for Rybczyński effect. That is, endowment changes
within these boundaries will be completely absorbed by an increase in ma-
chinery sector output and contraction of food output without causing adjust-
ments of relative factor prices. In this segment relative demand for skilled
labor is perfectly elastic which is shown by the solid dark blue line. Further-
more, if the relative demand is higher than E∗∗, the unskilled labor will be
relatively expensive so that profits in food production will fall below zero,
and consequently only machinery will be produced. Here, again, the relative
factor prices will depend also on relative factor endowment and not only on
prices and technology (the solid black line).
Summarizing, when the relative endowments in skilled or unskilled labor
are low, the economy specializes in one product only (E < E∗ or E > E∗∗)
and the relative wages are determined by product prices, technology and
relative labor endowment, while between these two extremes the economy
produces both goods (E∗ < E < E∗∗), so that the relative wages depend
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Figure 3.1: Relative Labor Demand in Heckscher-Ohlin Model
solely on product prices and technology and are insensitive to relative supply
changes. Changes in prices or technology will also influence the position
of relative demand schedule. In terms of Figure 3.1, the flat portion of
relative demand for skilled labor will shift up when price and/or total factor
productivity (TFP) growth is concentrated in the skill-intensive machinery
sector, while it will move down when this growth is concentrated in the low
skill-intensive food sector.
Haskel and Slaughter (2001) point out, that the above reasoning can be
generalized for the case of I production factors and J sectors.2 Then, if the
number of factors is less or equal than the number of sectors (I ≤ J), the
factor rewards are completely determined by zero profit conditions, while for
a larger number of factors than products (I > J) also factor supplies matter.
Thus, assuming that the labor market is characterized by a flat portion of
relative labor demand, equation (3.1) allows for assessment of relative wage
2Ethier (1974) and Jones and Scheinkman (1977) highlighted the central prediction of
the generalized theorem which is valid for such relaxations: with many goods and factors
a tariff change will always raise the real return of at least one factor and lower the real
return of at least one other factor.
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effects of change in prices and technology.
3.3 Empirical Model
This section provides a formalization of the arguments outlined above. The
point of departure is an economy’s entire set of zero profit conditions:
pj =
∑
i∈I
aijwi +
∑
k∈K
bkjpk (3.2)
In comparison to (3.1) this equation contains an extra term: bkj denoting
the number of units of intermediate input k required to produce one unit
of product j. The original version of Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not
consider intermediate inputs, in the real world they are however important
(Slaughter (2000b)).3 This set of zero-profit conditions can be rewritten as
follows:
pV Aj = pj −
∑
k∈K
bkjpk =
∑
i∈I
aijwi (3.3)
where pV Aj designates value added prices.
Totally differentiating equation (3.3) and using the standard measurement
of the growth of TFP4 we obtain:
p̂V Aj =
∑
i∈I
Θijŵi − T̂FP j (3.4)
where Θ is a share of factor i in a cost of product j, and w is a change of
wage of factor i.5
We can express this equation as a regression treating ŵi as the coefficient
of the random variable Θij:
p̂V Aj =
∑
i∈I
Θijβi − T̂FP j + εj (3.5)
3In Poland in 1990s intermediate inputs accounted on average for over 60 percent of
sales (Rocznik Statystyczny Przemys lu).
4TFP is defined as the growth in output minus growth in production factors weighted
by factor cost shares.
5Equation (3.4) is derived for infinitesimal changes. With discrete changes an extra
term appears: p̂V Aj =
∑
i Θijŵi − T̂FP j +
∑
i Θijŵiâij .
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where εj measures deviations of industry-specific factor price changes from
their manufacturing-wide changes.6 βi, the coefficients on the factor cost
shares (Θij), are then to be interpreted as economy wide factor price changes
predicted by the changes in prices and TFP. In other words, these are fac-
tor price changes that maintain zero profit conditions in all sectors following
changes in prices and productivity. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that
when fully specified, this regression becomes an identity. That is, they mea-
sure εj with available data for the US and subtract it from TFP obtaining a
so called effective TFP. Using this measure in estimating equation (3.5) they
obtain β that are similar to actual factor price changes. Therefore, regression
(3.5) merely presents how prices and productivity move in accord with factor
prices. Consequently, in order to identify the influence of international trade
and technology on factor prices it is necessary to analyze the impact they
have on product prices and productivity.
For this purpose Feenstra and Hanson (1999) develop the following two
stage methodology. In the first step, price and TFP changes are endoge-
nized. The impact of underlying regressors Zjl, which are assumed to drive
TFP changes over the examined period is modeled as:
T̂FP j =
∑
l∈L
Zjlδl + νj (3.6)
Furthermore, the productivity improvements might have an impact on
price changes. Growth of productivity can be “passed through” to industry
prices, if a country is large enough to influence world prices, or if technology
shocks are common across countries (Krugman (2000)). Thus, TFP together
with the structural variables Zjl has further influence on price changes:
p̂V Aj = λT̂FP j +
∑
l∈L
Zjlγl + ηj (3.7)
where λ is the pass-through coefficient of productivity changes to price
changes. Note, that in this equation Zjl have a direct impact on prices and an
6These deviations can be explained by unobserved variation in factor quality or sector-
specific rent. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999) I assume that the only source of
variation in factor prices is factor quality across industries, since this is consistent with
the assumption of perfect mobility of factors among industries.
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indirect impact through productivity. The need to include this direct impact
comes from the possible presence of non-neutral technological progress. In
the case of Hicks-neutral change any technological progress will be offset by
a drop in price, so that γ will equal 0. In contrast, in the case of non-neutral,
skill-biased technological progress, after an initial price decrease in response
to technological change, price has to increase again because the relative de-
mand for skilled labor has risen and therefore its wage. In this case γ is
different from 0.7 Thus, this approach enables to account for sector-biased
as well as skill-biased technological change.
Merging the above equations, the total impact of the structural variables
on prices and productivity can be expressed as:
p̂j + T̂FP j =
∑
l∈L
Zjlφl + µj (3.8)
where φ = (1 + λ)δ + γ.
In the second stage the structural variables’ contributions to p̂j + T̂FP j
are regressed on factor-cost shares (Θij):
Zjlφl =
∑
i∈I
Θijρi + υj (3.9)
The second-stage coefficients (ρi) obtained from these regressions are then
interpreted as changes in factor prices predicted by the structural variables
working via changes of product prices and productivity growth, holding ev-
erything else constant.
This type of regression might appear counter-intuitive since the variable
of interest, factor-price changes, is estimated rather than being the dependent
variable. A standard regression cannot be used because the dimensionality
of data hinders inversion of the factor requirements matrix. For example, my
data set contains 95 manufacturing industries, but only 3 primary factors.
Thus, this type of regression can be interpreted as math exercise, rather than
as identifying causation usually assumed by the regression.
Summarizing, in the first stage contributions of each underlying structural
variable to changes in value added prices and TFP are calculated, while the
7For a detailed discussion see Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
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second stage estimates what changes in factor prices are predicted by these
contributions.
3.4 Review of Product Price Studies
In recent years many economists have analyzed the role of international trade
and technology in rising wage inequality. Most of these studies consider the
experience of the United States. In this section I concentrate on papers which
also apply the product price methodology.8
While Bhagwati (1991) was the first economist who links the rising wage
inequality in the US to the apparent development in import and export prices,
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) are the first researchers to employ prod-
uct price changes in econometric analysis in order to examine the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. As outlined in Section 3.2, according to this theorem
an observed increase in relative wages of skilled workers should be correlated
with a relative decline of prices in unskilled labor intensive sectors. The au-
thors investigate whether prices of skilled labor-intensive commodities have
increased relative to prices of products that intensively employ unskilled la-
bor. For this purpose they regress domestic, import and export price changes
on relative employment of skilled workers in US manufacturing over the 1980s
and find that relatively skill-intensive sectors did not exhibit larger price in-
creases than relatively low skill intensive ones. The authors assume that
product price changes are completely determined by foreign developments
and therefore they conclude that international trade in the 1980s in the US
was not responsible for the increase in the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers.
Using more or less the same data for the US, following a similar method-
ology and relying on the same assumption as the previous study, Sachs and
Schatz (1994), obtain a contradictory result.9 They come to this finding by
simply adding a dummy for the computer industry to the price regression.
8For more extensive review see Slaughter (2002b).
9Sachs and Schatz (1994) define the 1980s as 1978 through 1989, while Lawrence and
Slaughter (1993) employ data covering 1980 - 1989.
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The authors argue that in the 1980s, the computer sector experienced a sub-
stantial decline in relative prices of computers corresponding to impressive
productivity gains, although an exact measurement of the price and pro-
ductivity change in this sector is difficult. For that reason, it seems to be
appropriate to exclude this sector from the regression. Thus, they conclude
that in the course of 1980s, that among remaining (non-computer) sectors
characterized by a large share of production workers in total employment
witnessed lower relative price increases than sectors where non-production
workers dominate.
The approach of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) is different. First, they do
not assume that changes in domestic prices merely track changes in interna-
tional prices. Second, in their framework countries produce different sets of
goods rather than are assumed to belong to the same diversification cone.
Their analysis is based on the model of international outsourcing presented
in the same paper (this model was briefly outlined in the previous section).
A corollary of the shift in relative demands and corresponding increase in
relative wage of skilled workers in both countries, North and South, is that
“the price index of the Northern inputs relative to that of the South” rises.
The authors perceive this as a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the
difference to the original that prices refer to the intermediate rather than final
goods. They observe that in the 1980s, US-domestic prices rose stronger than
import prices and conclude that this fact supports the idea that outsourcing
of production of relatively low-skill intensive intermediaries and importing
them back have contributed to an increase in US wage inequality.
Leamer (1998) also uses the zero profit conditions methodology. Unlike
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Sachs and Schatz (1994) who assumed
that US is a small price taking economy where domestic prices are com-
pletely determined by international developments, he allows the technolog-
ical progress to have an impact on price changes. He introduces a “pass-
through” coefficient that describes how much of TFP growth is assumed to
be transferred into product price declines. Leamer (1998) considers different
pass-through coefficients of 0 and 1. The portion of product price changes
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not accounted for by TFP changes is then interpreted as generally asso-
ciated with globalization. The price regressions in his study estimate the
factor price changes “mandated” by product price changes, and depending
on the pass-through coefficient and/or technology. He weights industries by
employment or value added. The estimated coefficients in those regressions
are then tested by comparison with apparent factor price changes. He ana-
lyzes the wage implications of product-price shifts during the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s in US using different combinations of primary factors of produc-
tion, skills, and pass-through rate.10 He concludes that results concerning
1960s are unclear, because various combinations yield contradictory predic-
tions about inequality, while 1970s appear to be a Stolper-Samuelson decade
“with product price changes causing increases in inequality”. The results
for the 1980s vary between different skill measures with the non-production
- production workers measure “mandating” rising inequality. Furthermore,
globalization effects tend to dominate technology effects through all three
decades.
Krueger (1997) applies both types of regression presented above to an-
alyze the influence of price changes on wage inequality in the US in the
1990s (defined as 1989 through 1994). He regresses product price changes
on relative industry factor employment, the share of production workers in
particular, both with and without a dummy variable for the computer in-
dustry. Both regressions yield negative statistically significant coefficients,
which implies that prices of skill-intensive goods did increase in the examined
period.
Furthermore, he employs the methodology of Leamer (1998), however he
is not trying to identify the sources of product price changes. Thus, he uses
only price changes as a dependent variable (domestic producer prices mostly
in final goods sectors). The author includes “more skilled” and “less skilled”
labor, capital and materials as independent variables. He finds that price
10Leamer (1998) uses the following combinations of primary factors: capital and labor,
capital plus labor disaggregated according to the rule that industries characterized by
higher wages are also more skill-intensive, and finally capital, non-production and produc-
tion workers.
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changes have warranted the rise in inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers. Comparing his results from both approaches with the observed wage
development, Krueger (1997) concludes that the extent of price changes is
approximately comparable with apparent wage changes, thus, his analysis
corroborates the theoretical implications of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
The studies presented above, however, do not provide any direct evidence
to what extent product prices depend on international trade. Instead, they
just assume that changes in domestic prices trace international developments.
The first attempt to distinguish between technology and what he calls glob-
alization effects was done by Leamer, but he does not attribute the latter to
any specific factor associated with international trade, such as trade barriers.
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) were the first researchers to endogenize price and
productivity developments. They argue that outsourcing of low-skill inten-
sive activities by changing the output mix of US economy influences total
factor productivity growth.11 Furthermore, they allow productivity to affect
product prices, without constraining its influence to any a priori assumed
rate.
The authors refine the zero profit condition framework used by Leamer
(1998) to the two stage methodology outlined in the previous section. In the
first step, they regress product-price changes plus observed TFP growth on
structural variables: outsourcing and real expenditures on high-technology
equipment, presumably measuring the influence of international trade and
technological progress. Outsourcing is proxied by imported intermediate in-
puts relative to total expenditure on non-energy intermediaries, to which
they refer as a broad measure. And also by imported intermediate inputs
from the same sector relative to total expenditure on non-energy interme-
diaries which they call a narrow measure. The rationale behind this is the
concept that foreign outsourcing is supposed to measure activities that are
transferred abroad but could have been done in the US. They find, that both
outsourcing and high-tech equipment positively influence the sum of product-
11Again, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) build on their model of international outsourcing
presented in the previous chapter.
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price changes and TFP growth. Thus, in the first stage the observed changes
in prices and TFP are decomposed into portions contributed by outsourcing
and high-tech equipment.
In the second stage these components are regressed on factor-cost shares
and the obtained coefficients are interpreted as warranted wage changes that
can be attributed to international trade and technological progress. Here
it appears that for the US between 1979 and 1990, the narrow outsourcing
measure predicts about 15 percent of the increase in wage gap between skilled
and unskilled workers, while 35 percent can be ascribed to technology.
Haskel and Slaughter (2001) apply the two stage methodology to study
the sources of changes in wage inequality in the UK in the 1970s, when the
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers declined and 1980s, when
the wage disparity increased. Their approach differs from Feenstra and Han-
son (1999) in terms of assumptions. They assume that productivity growth
cannot influence product price changes and assess predicted wage and in-
equality changes separately for trade and technology. The authors find that
price changes mandated an increase in inequality in the 1970s and 1980s,
while growth in productivity predicted a rise in inequality in the 1970s and a
decline during 1980s in the UK. The positive effect of TFP changes in 1970s
is attributed to innovation activity and international competition. The nega-
tive effect of productivity growth in 1980s is due to union density. Regarding
price changes, the authors find that trade played its role in the 1970s through
the sector bias pressures on domestic prices, but not in the 1980s. That is,
the question of what determined the positive influence of price developments
on wage inequality in the 1980s remains unanswered.
3.4.1 Summary of Literature
The studies by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Sachs and Schatz (1994)
merely check the consistency of product price changes and observed devel-
opments in wage inequality. They do so by investigating the relationship
between price changes in industries and their skill intensity. That is, if the
price of products employing skilled workers relatively intensively is found
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to increase, they interpret this as a manifestation of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem and because of the small price taking country assumption also as
influence of international trade. These studies, however, cannot assess to
what extent the product prices possibly contributed to factor price changes.
Furthermore, they only broadly capture the gist of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, as they relate price changes to factor employment levels, while
equation (3.4) provides a link between price changes and factor cost shares
(Slaughter (2000b)) and employ only final good factor intensities ignoring
those incorporated in intermediate inputs. Finally, such analysis does not
contain any evidence about the sources of observed price changes.
The “mandated” wages methodology surpasses “consistency check” re-
gressions in a few important aspects. First, the former approach is based on
zero profit conditions and therefore closer to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Second, this framework can be utilized not only for analyzing the impact of
price changes, but of productivity growth as well, as shown by Leamer (1998)
and Feenstra and Hanson (1999). Third, these studies enable assessment of
the contribution of technology and prices to wage development as the wage
changes predicted by price and technological progress can be compared with
observed wage changes. Finally, the two stage procedure elaborated by Feen-
stra and Hanson (1999) provides a link between factor price changes and in-
ternational trade and technology, as it allows to attribute product price and
productivity developments to factors associated with international trade and
technology indicators.
3.5 Estimation Strategy
As argued in the discussion in the previous section, the two stage approach
proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) provides the best approximation of
factor price changes predicted by increase in international trade and techno-
logical progress to maintain the zero profit condition in each producing sector.
Therefore, I will apply this estimation technique to Polish manufacturing in-
dustries for the period from 1994 to 2002. All the below equations constitute
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cross sectional models which can be estimated by OLS across sectors.
I will precede the analysis with a so called “consistency check” regression,
cited in the review of empirical literature, in order to show that results change
substantially when accounting for the presence of intermediate inputs and
using factor cost shares rather than relative factor intensities. This regression
takes the form:
∆ ln pj = α
(
LHS
LLS
)
j
+ εj (3.10)
where ∆ ln pj is the final good price growth rate between 1994 and 2002
and
(
LHS
LLS
)
j
is the average non-production to production employment ratio
in industry j over this period.
Next, the model derived from the zero profit conditions under the assump-
tion of exogeneity of TFP and value added price changes will be estimated
to show that such an approach leads to a prediction of wage changes that are
necessarily similar to observed wage adjustments. Following equation (3.4) I
will estimate three regressions:
∆ ln TFPj =
∑
i∈I
Θijβi + εj (3.11)
∆ ln pV Aj =
∑
i∈I
Θijβi + εj (3.12)
∆ ln pV Aj = λ∆ ln TFPj +
∑
i∈I
Θijβi + εj (3.13)
where ∆ ln TFPj is the TFP growth rate in each industry j between 1994
and 2002 and Θij denotes the factor cost shares, while λ is again defined as
the “pass-through” coefficient of TFP growth to value added prices.
Finally, I will adopt the two stage approach to the data. In the first stage,
as outlined above, I regress TFP growth and value added price changes on a
set of underlying regressors.
∆ ln pV Aj + ∆ ln TFPj =
∑
m∈M
Zmjδm + εj (3.14)
where Zmj is a set of structural variables m.
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I will also present the estimates decomposing the dependent variable from
(3.14):
∆ ln TFPj =
∑
m∈M
Zmjφm + εj (3.15)
∆ ln pV Aj =
∑
m∈M
Zmjγm + εj (3.16)
Additionaly, in order to address the hypothesis of skill-biased technological
change, following equation (3.7) I will estimate:
∆ ln pV Aj = λ∆ ln TFPj +
∑
m∈M
Zmjρm + εj (3.17)
If ρ in this regression are significantly different from 0 I will interpret this as
presence of non-neutral technical change and justification of the assumption
of TFP determinants also having direct influence on value added prices.
Finally, the second stage will be estimated:
δmZmj =
∑
i∈I
Θijσi + εmj (3.18)
where δmZmj are the contributions of structural variables m to value added
price and TFP changes from regression (3.14). The estimated coefficients, σi,
are then interpreted as factor-price changes predicted by international trade
and technology development that are transmitted to domestic product price
changes and growth of TFP.
3.6 Variables and Data
The first stage requires the identification of variables that can provide a link
between international trade and technology development and product price
changes plus TFP growth. The first component of the dependent variable -
changes of value added prices - has been computed from the volume of value
added in current and constant prices. The second component is a primal TFP
measure defined as the growth of value added minus the factor cost share
weighted average growth of primary inputs: non-production and production
workers and capital. I impose the assumption of perfect competition, so that
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revenue equals costs, and thus cost shares are measured by revenue shares.
The cost share of capital is then one minus the cost share of non-production
and production workers.
3.6.1 Structural Variables for the First Stage
The influence of international trade is measured by changes in prices of im-
ports (IMPORT PRICES) and the share of exports and import in sales
(EXP/Y and IMP/Y , respectively). Concerning the import prices, recall
that Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Sachs and Schatz (1994) simply
assume that US domestic prices track changes on international markets. By
introducing this variable I want to measure to what extent the changes in
domestic prices really reflect international developments. For example the
differences between domestic and import prices can be explained by existence
of trade restrictions.12
Another explanation is that importers and wholesalers face a series of
binding internal constraints when they want to increase their sales. Then,
declines in world prices will be only imperfectly transmitted to domestic
prices because, if existing sales are constrained by marketing capacity, im-
porters will compensate the rising marketing costs by raising their selling
prices. Potentially, this bottleneck approach can apply to a variety of costs,
such as processing, distribution and transportation, all of which play a sig-
nificant role in setting domestic prices in commodity markets.
Regarding import and export, I include these variables to test the hy-
pothesis that international trade induces changes in productivity. It can be
understand twofold. First, imports and exports can enhance productivity
of domestic producers through the competition channel. In this context, of
course, also import prices may have impact on TFP. In sectors characterized
by declining world prices competition is more fierce. On the other hand,
export and import, as argued by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), can also have
influence on the output mix. That is, goods that were previously produced
at home are gradually replaced by imports, because they can be produced
12Due to the lack of data I cannot include tariffs or import quotas in my analysis.
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more efficiently abroad, which results in an increase of productivity as the
home country is concentrating on goods in which it has a cost advantage.
The different technological opportunities in various industries are mea-
sured by two variables: share of R&D expenditures in sales (R&D/Y )and
computer intensity of sales (COMPIND/Y ). The latter is included for ro-
bustness, since Poland in general is not perceived as a worldwide technology
leader and most of its technical improvements in production processes are
probably coming from purchases of new technology, imitation, technology
spillovers or are brought to the country by foreign firms.
Moreover, I added the privatization and foreign capital measures in order
to account for the transition and liberalization process in Poland, which both
could have influenced the observed increasing skill premium. Privatization
is measured by the share of private employment in the total employment
(PRIV EMP/EMP ) and the foreign capital by the foreign share in total
equity (FORCAP/CAP ). The rationale here is that privatization and FDI
might have led to organizational change which has an effect similar to skill-
biased technical change. Empirical literature provides a lot of evidence on
the role of the increasing diffusion of new organizational practices within
firms in the increasing demand for skilled workers.
For instance, Greenan and Guellec (1998) find that organizational change
- such as greater worker autonomy and increased communication among
workers - was positively correlated with skill upgrading in France. Again with
regard to France, Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) and Caroli et al. (2001), find
respectively a strong negative correlation between product turnover and the
number of blue-collar workers, and a skill bias effect resulting from organiza-
tional change in association with a reduction in the firm’s size, which proba-
bly suggests an evolution toward more flexible firms. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) compare two panels of French and British firms, focusing mainly on
organizational change. Their results, which supported the skill-biased tech-
nological change hypothesis, prove to be econometrically significant in both
panels.
Furthermore, it has been recognized that FDI has a great potential to
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enhance the catching-up process in transition countries, since it brings tech-
nology and managerial know-how. Private firms, as argued in the previ-
ous chapter, have stronger incentives to reorganize and modernize aiming at
efficiency improvement than their public counterparts. In a recent paper,
Brown, Earle, Telegdy (2004) analyze the impact of privatization on produc-
tivity in Romania, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia. They find privatization
substantially raising productivity in Romania and Hungary. Moreover, priva-
tization to foreign rather than domestic investors appears to have a stronger
impact.
3.6.2 Dependent Variables for the Second Stage
In the second stage, the portions of the sum of value-added prices and TFP
changes explained by independent variables from the first stage are regressed
on the factor cost shares in value added. The dependent variable is obtained
by multiplying the first-stage coefficients with respective first-stage indepen-
dent variables, while factor cost shares are average values over the period
1994 to 2002.
3.6.3 Data
Data on non-production and production workers, sales, value added, employ-
ment, R&D expenditures and industrial computers are provided in electronic
form at 3-digit NACE level by the Polish Statistical Office (PSO), while the
information about imports and exports has been computed from the UN
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE).13
3.7 Estimation Results
Before presenting results from the two stage procedure, in Table 3.1 the
“consistency check” regressions are reported. These regressions investigate
whether prices of skilled labor intensive commodities have increased rela-
tive to prices of goods that predominantly require unskilled labor in their
13For detailed description of data and variables see Appendix.
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production.
Table 3.1: “Consistency Check” Regressions
dependent variables: changes in product prices
(1) (2)
share of non− production workers 0.059* 0.086***
in production employment (0.032) (0.028)
computer industry dummy -1.026***
(0.094)
R2 0.013 0.183
N 95 95
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; ***
(**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors
robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses; N - number of
observations.
In column (1) of Table 3.1 product price changes are regressed on the
relative skill intensity of sectors measured by the share of non-production
workers in production workers’ employment as equation (3.10) shows. In
column (2) following Sachs and Schatz (1994) the dummy variable for the
computer industry is included. These regressions suggest that in the period
between 1994 and 2002 relative prices of goods that relatively intensively
employ skilled workers increased in Poland. However, as has been criticized
above, such an approach only broadly captures the Stolper-Samuelson logic
and therefore may not be as informative as the zero profit conditions ap-
proach. Gradual refinement of the empirical methodology in the subsequent
part of chapter will show that the result obtained from the “consistency
check” regression cannot be used to infer on the role of international trade
in the development of factor prices.
3.7.1 One-Stage Mandated Wage Regressions
For the purpose of this section it is assumed that value-added price changes
and TFP growth are exogenous, that is equations (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13)
are estimated. Table 3.2 reports the results of these one stage regressions for
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Poland. Dependent variables are TFP in the two first and price changes in
the four remaining columns. They are regressed on three primary factors:
non-production workers’ cost share, production workers’ cost share and capi-
tal cost share. The estimated coefficients should be interpreted as respective
factor renumeration changes “mandated” by the change in dependent vari-
able.
In order to read this table first consider column (1). The coefficient
on non-production workers’ share indicates that the productivity changes
predicted a rise in the skilled wage of 435 percent to maintain zero profit
conditions in all sectors. Similarly, the predicted change in the production
workers’ wage was a fall of about 8 percent. This coefficient is however
statistically insignificant. In the last row, the change in wage inequality is
reported. Here, the growth of productivity predicted an increase of inequality
by 442 percent (equal to 434.5 rise in skilled wage minus a 7.9 percent drop
in unskilled wage).
In the second regression, following Sachs and Schatz (1994), the dummy
variable for the computer industry is added. The coefficient on the dummy
appears to be insignificant but its inclusion diminishes the growth of pre-
dicted inequality to 330 percent. Regarding price changes reported in
columns (3) to (6), in specification (3) they predict a fall in non-production
wage by 76 percent and an increase in production wage by 27 percent, both
insignificantly. This means that price changes predicted a fall in inequal-
ity by 103 percent, at least in the regression without the computer dummy.
The addition of the computer industry dummy in column (4) substantially
decreases the predicted change in inequality to 2 percent only.
In the last two columns I allowed productivity changes to have an impact
on prices. The coefficient on TFP can be interpreted as λ, the pass-through
coefficient from equation (3.13). Its statistical significance in both regressions
implies that, at least to some extent, the growth of TFP is translated into a
fall in product prices. Adding TFP to price regression considerably changes
the result. In specifications (5) and (6) changes in prices predicted a rise
in inequality by 60 and 76 percent, respectively. The argument of Feenstra
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and Hanson (1999) outlined above, that if fully specified such a regression
necessarily predicts wage changes that have actually occurred, is visible in
column (5). The estimated wage changes in this specification, 87 percent for
non-production workers and 27 percent for production workers are almost
equal to the observed wage changes: 63 and 29 percent, respectively.14
Table 3.2 and the above discussion clearly show that in order to analyze
the influence of international trade and technology on skilled and unskilled
wages it is necessary to endogenize the changes in value added prices and
TFP, which is done below.
3.7.2 First Stage Regressions
Table 3.3 reports results of estimating equations (3.14), where the changes
in value added prices and growth in TFP are regressed on a set of structural
variables. Additionally, the estimations for both components: TFP growth
and changes in value added prices are presented separately, as in equations
(3.15) - (3.17). In the first two columns the dependent variable is the sum of
value added price changes and the growth of TFP, in specifications (3) and
(4) it has been replaced by the TFP growth and in the last four columns by
changes in value added prices.
First consider columns (1) and (2). Both technology variables, share
of R&D expenditures in sales as well as a number of industrial computers
divided by sales, have a positive and statistically significant influence on
changes in value added prices plus TFP growth. The magnitude of foreign
presence is also positively and significantly correlated with the dependent
variable, while the extent of privatization negatively influences the sum of
value added price changes and TFP growth. Furthermore, the coefficient on
the share of imports is negative and statistically significant. Considering the
share of exports in sales its coefficient has a positive sign but is statistically
insignificant. Finally, the import prices coefficient has a negative sign while
being statistically significant in column (1) and only slightly over the 10
14The estimates of wage changes from columns (5) and (6) are slightly different from
observed wage changes due to deviations of industry specific wage changes from their
manufacturing wide changes.
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percent threshold in specification (2).
Columns (3) to (6) provide background information for first two specifi-
cations by presenting estimation results for decomposed dependent variable
from columns (1) and (2). Specifications (3) and (4) show that as expected
both measurements of technology have enhanced TFP growth. The same
applies to foreign capital, TFP growth appears to be stronger in industries
that are characterized by a relatively high share of foreign capital. The
PRIV EMP/EMP coefficient delivers an ambiguous result. In specification
(3) it is positive, while in column (4) it is negative, and in both it is sta-
tistically insignificant. That is, contrary to the expectations, privatization
does not seem to raise productivity. Considering the import share, in col-
umn (3) the coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant,
while in column (4) it becomes negative and very low and it is no longer sig-
nificant. The export share in sales yields a more consistent result, as it is
positive and statistically significant in both specifications. With regard to
import prices, their changes negatively influence TFP growth, again being
statistically significant in column (3) and narrowly missing the 10 percent
significance level in specification (4). Overall, in sectors more exposed to
international competition TFP growth tends to be higher, as expected.
In columns (5) and (6), changes in value added prices are regressed on
structural variables. All variables except import prices and the share of
foreign capital in total equity negatively influence the dependent variable.
That is, in sectors with high shares of private employment and large shares
of export and import, the value added prices tend to grow slower, while
in industries characterized by relatively large share of foreign capital, value
added prices increase faster. The technology variables also influence value
added prices in a negative way, insignificantly so. The intuitive explanation
here is that these both variables are important determinants of TFP growth,
and the positive changes in TFP as shown by next two columns, are to
some extent transmitted as a negative effect on value added price changes.
Regarding the IMPORT PRICES coefficient, recall that it measures the
extent to which development in world prices is conveyed to domestic prices. It
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appears that changes in domestic value added prices are positively correlated
with import prices, the coefficient is however significant only at 10 percent
level. This result suggests that although a link exists between international
and domestic commodity markets, it is less strong as one would expect.
Finally, in the last two columns I test for the presence of skill biased
technological change. As argued in Section 3.3, structural variables can
have a direct and indirect, through TFP growth, impact on value added
prices. When estimating columns (1) and (2) I assumed that both effects
take place, that is the value added price changes are influenced by sector
biased and skill biased technological change. Following equation (3.17) I add
TFP growth as an independent variable to regressions determining changes
in value added prices in columns (6) and (7). The statistical significance
of structural variables in those specifications indicates that even after ac-
counting for TFP growth those variables have influence on changes in value
added prices through non-neutral technical change. The results in the last
two columns confirm that indeed, in the case of foreign capital, privatization
and imports, my assumption was correct.
3.7.3 Second Stage Regressions
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results of equation (3.18) for each of the
determinants of the sum of value added price changes and TFP growth from
Table 3.3. The upper part of this table employs portions of value added
price and TFP changes explained by row regressors from column (1), while
the lower part shows the estimation results for independent variables taken
from column (2) of Table 3.3. Again, the coefficients presented in this table
should be interpreted as changes of remuneration of respective production
factors that have been “mandated” by changes in value added prices and
productivity attributed to structural variables from Table 3.3 to maintain
zero profit conditions in each sector. In other words, for each structural
variable its warranted change in non-production workers’ wages, production
workers’ wages and the change in inequality is predicted.
Three significant results can be derived from Table 3.4. First, both vari-
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ables measuring technology parameters, R&D/Y and INDCOMP/Y , pre-
dicted a substantial increase in non-production workers’ wages compared to
production workers. In the case of industrial computers it even “mandated”
a fall in earnings of unskilled workers, however insignificantly. It appears that
growth of TFP induced by R&D and high-tech equipment was concentrated
in skill-intensive industries throughout the examined period, and therefore
raised inequality.
Second, also foreign capital predicted an increase in the gap between
skilled and unskilled workers’ earnings by “mandating” a considerable in-
crease in skilled wages. As argued above, the interpretation here is that
during the period examined, the magnitude of foreign activities led to orga-
nizational change that was biased toward non-production workers. This is
confirmed in column (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 where this variable appears to
be significant which indicates the presence of skill biased technological change
in sectors with high shares of foreign capital in total equity. Additionally,
specifications (3) and (4) of the same table support the idea that foreign firms
also generated sector biased technological change in skill intensive industries.
Finally, the export share in sales, as pointed out in the introduction,
predicted a fall in inequality “mandating” a stronger increase of production
workers’ wages than non-production workers’ wages, which is in line with
predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that in Poland, as a low skilled
labor abundant country in comparison to its trading partners, low skilled
workers would benefit from trade. This result can be regarded as an in-
dication that the growth in productivity enhanced by exports took place
in low skill intensive, rather than high skill intensive sectors. For the sake
of completeness it must be mentioned that, the other structural variables,
PRIV EMP/EMP , IMP/Y and IMPORT PRICES, yield insignificant
results regarding changes in skilled and unskilled workers’ reward.
To conclude this section, it is important to discuss the differences between
the “mandated” changes in wage inequality presented in Table 3.4 and the
actual changes, 63 percent and 29 percent for non-production and production
workers, respectively, corresponding to a 34 percent growth in wage disparity.
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The fact, that the predicted changes in the case of both technology measures
as well as foreign capital measure amount to more than 100 percent of actual
growth of wage inequality can be explained in two ways. On one hand,
the coefficients from Table 3.3 used for calculation of dependent variables
for Table 3.4 were estimated holding other independent variables constant
and thus the predicted changes in inequality are calculated neglecting other
changes that might also influence them.
On the other hand, for the purpose of analysis in this chapter it was
assumed, that any labor supply shifts cause only Rybczyński effects, that is
an increase in skilled workers supply would induce expansion of production
in sectors relatively intensively employing skilled workers. However, with the
assumed labor demand function, when labor supply shock is large enough it
can even stimulate a country to produce a different set of products, which
in terms of Figure 3.1 would mean movement to another flat part of the
function. Thus, as the relative number of skilled workers steadily increased
in the course of transformation in Poland, the growth of inequality could
have been dampened.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter is a contribution to the intense economic debate about the im-
pact of international trade and technology on growth of inequality between
earnings of high skilled and low skilled workers that was observed in many
countries during the last 25 years. During the last decade, also high skilled
workers in Poland benefited from a sharp increase of their earnings com-
pared to low skilled workers, as wage inequality grew by 4.1 percent per year
on average. The theoretical literature offers three possible explanations of
this phenomena, related to technology, international trade and international
outsourcing. This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the role interna-
tional trade and technology have for the apparent labor market adjustment
in Poland, while the outsourcing hypothesis was the subject of Chapter 2.
For this purpose, a two stage approach to zero profit conditions method-
ology elaborated by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) in the context of the US
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is applied to data from Polish manufacturing spanning 1994 to 2002. This
method is superior to earlier approaches as it allows to identify what under-
lying forces cause changes in productivity and prices in each sector which in
turn influence factor price changes.
The analysis shows that in Poland both technology and international
trade have contributed to development of wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers. These forces, however worked against each other:
the technology variables contributed substantially to TFP growth in skilled
intensive sectors and therefore predicted the increase in wage inequality, while
productivity changes induced by export were apparently concentrated in low
skilled intensive sectors causing exports to “mandate” a fall in inequality.
Given that Poland is relatively low skilled labor abundant, the latter result
confirms a textbook prediction of the Heckscher - Ohlin model, that the
abundant factor will benefit from international trade. However, this negative
effect on wage disparity is small compared to technology contribution, which
prevails.
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3.9 Appendix
Calculation of TFP growth
TFP growth was constructed as:
∆ ln TFPj = ∆ ln V Aj − (∆ ln LHSj ΘHSj + ∆ ln LLSj ΘLSj + ∆ ln KjΘKj)
where V Aj is defined as value added in sector j, L
HS
j and L
LS
j denote non-
production workers and production workers in sector j, respectively, Kj
stands for capital stock in sector j, and Θij denotes every factor share in
cost function. Since the assumption of perfect competition is imposed, rev-
enue equals cost and cost shares are measured by revenue shares. The cost
share of capital is one minus the cost shares of non-production and produc-
tion workers. The capital stock is obtained by multiplying the cost share of
capital with value added.
Calculation of changes in value added prices
The data set obtained from Polish Statistical Office (PSO) in electronic form
contained the volume of value added expressed in current and constant prices.
In order to calculate changes in value added prices, the growth of value added
measured in constant prices has been subtracted from the growth of value
added in current prices.
Calculation of import prices
The import prices, changes of which were used in the regressions, were ob-
tained as follows: Data from the UN COMTRADE database was down-
loaded in 5 digit-SITC Rev.3 classification. The data set included the value
and quantity of import, respectively expressed in USD and in various units
(number of items, volume in liters, weight in kilograms). The data were then
converted to 4-digit ISIC Rev.3, using conversion tables from the Eurostat
COMEXT CD.
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The final aggregation to 3 digit ISIC yielded the import prices, according to
the following formula:
pIMPj =
∑
i
(
Vji
Qji
× Vji∑
i Vji
)
where pIMPj is import price in sector j (3-digit ISIC), Vji is defined as the
value of import in sector ji (4-digit ISIC) and Qji denotes the quantity of
import in sector ji (4-digit ISIC). This weighting procedure was chosen to
overcome the diversity of trade quantity measures in the input data (different
units). The weighted import prices in USD were eventually converted to PLN
using exchange rates reported by the National Bank of Poland.
NACE versus ISIC
NACE Rev.1 is the classification of economic activities corresponding to ISIC
Rev.3 at European level. It is totally in line with ISIC Rev.3 and can thus be
regarded as its European counterpart. In particular, the third (3-digit) and
fourth (4-digit) levels of ISIC Rev.3 are subdivided in NACE Rev.1 according
to European requirements. However, the third and fourth levels of NACE
Rev.1 can always be aggregated into the groups and classes of ISIC Rev.3
from which they were derived.15
15See ISIC / NACE relationship (2002).
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Chapter 4
Location Determinants of
Export-oriented versus
Market-seeking FDI in Poland
4.1 Introduction
As part of their economic development strategies, governments of many coun-
tries attempt to stimulate the economic activity in lagging regions by tax ex-
emptions, public grants or factor subsidies. In particular, policy makers aim
at attracting foreign investment which is perceived as being eminently bene-
ficial for host locations. In virtually every country countless institutions and
agencies, on the governmental as well as regional and local level, are involved
in this process. A key prerequisite for such policy efforts is to understand
the determinants of FDI location.
The driving forces, however, may differ for different types of FDI. The
theoretical literature distinguishes two types of foreign investment: horizon-
tal and vertical FDI. Differentiation between these types of investment is of
even greater importance as the effects of FDI on the host country depend on
the kind of undertaken activity. Market-seeking, also called horizontal FDI
aims at accessing local markets by replicating the production of the same
goods and services in both the home and host country and arises because
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trade barriers make exporting costly. On the other hand, export-oriented,
or vertical FDI fragments the production of a good or service into stages
located in different countries and is targeted at re-exporting final or interme-
diate products into the home country or into other countries. In this case,
FDI emerges to take advantage of international factor price differences.1
In this chapter I utilize recent regional data to estimate the determinants
of horizontal and vertical FDI in Poland. While there exists ample empirical
literature investigating why firms becomes multinational, analyzes of where
firms locate are quite scarce, despite the recent revival of interest in the
new economic geography. Among studies on foreign firms’ location choice,
only few studies discuss the evidence from transition countries and more
importantly only few of them compare different types of investment.
In 1989, Poland was the first country out of the former Soviet block to ini-
tiate an economic transition to a market economy. The sudden policy changes
were followed by large inflows of foreign direct investment and a subsequent
uneven spatial distribution of FDI. This sequence of events provides a kind of
a natural experiment, since in contrast to developed countries, the inflow of
foreign investment to Poland as well as other transition countries is a recent
phenomenon which allows to explore the motives of multinationals from the
very beginning.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 surveys the the-
oretical framework used for the analysis in this chapter, and the empirical
literature that has been accumulated so far. Section 4.3 provides detailed
background on regional development in Poland with particular focus on indi-
cators used in the econometric part of the chapter. The estimation strategy
along with a description of data and a discussion of explanatory variables are
presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 reports the results of the analysis and
Section 4.6 concludes.
1These both types of FDI are typically interpreted as applying to manufacturing. How-
ever, data used for the analysis in this chapter also contains foreign firms engaged in the
service sector. In this context services can be seen as a commodity which is characterized
by very high export costs. For further discussion on how my data set relates to the notion
of vertical and horizontal FDI see Section 4.4.2.
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4.2 Related Literature
As a departing point for further analysis, this section provides a survey of
the existing literature of location decisions of multinational firms. I will first
look at the theoretical framework that has been developed in the literature
so far. The second part will be devoted to a discussion of previous empirical
studies.
4.2.1 Theoretical Foundations
The theoretical literature on multinational firms and in particular on FDI
is quite extensive and the profound understanding of motives and effects of
foreign investment requires a very complex approach involving a number of
economic models. Thus, in this section I will concentrate only on selected
topics, directly related to the subject of this chapter. In particular the lo-
cation theory of economic activities and its more recent extension, the new
economic geography, as well as the theories of vertical and horizontal FDI
will be reviewed.
The key question of the location theory is: why do particular economic
activities choose to establish themselves in certain places of a given area?
Plenty of effort has been invested in answering this question since 1826, when
von Thünen published a pioneer work in this field. The general approach of
virtually all theoretical models since the 1960s seems to be simple: the goal is
to select a location that maximizes profit. Since the profit can be generally
viewed as the difference between revenue and cost, the determinants that
boost revenue and decrease production cost will be the ones that influence
location choices of economic activities.
On the cost side, the most obvious candidates are those related to pro-
duction factors and transportation costs. Firms will more likely locate their
activities on a site characterized by low wages, high productivity and good
access to raw materials, qualified labor and intermediate inputs. The great
importance of transportation costs was emphasized already a century ago
by Webber (1909). In his least-cost model he established the key trade-off
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faced by a firm while taking the decision about its localization: being close
to consumers or being close to production inputs.
On the revenue side, one factor affecting the desirability of locating a
plant at a specific location is the market potential. The idea that market
size matters for the location of industry dates back at least to Harris (1954).
Regions where demand for a firm’s good is high should offer greater opportu-
nities for turnover. For producers of final goods this means that they would
likely locate their activities near sites where they find a large pool of cus-
tomers, whereas an intermediate goods producer would seek to locate in the
proximity of final goods producers. The extent of the impact of market ac-
cess on the location decision depends again on the level of transport costs.
With very high transport costs the economic activity will likely spread out,
while with negligible transport costs the distribution of firms will be random
since the proximity to markets and production inputs will not matter.
In traditional location models production was assumed to occur under
conditions of constant returns to scale. However, with such an assumption
firms have no incentive to concentrate the activity in just a few places and
their location decisions are merely related to the existence of non-zero trans-
portation costs. That is, assuming constant returns to scale in production
will result in “many small plants supplying local markets” (Fujita and Thisse
(1996)). Obviously, this stands in contrast to empirical observations.
The study of location decisions has come to the forefront again with the
development of the new economic geography following the seminal paper by
Krugman (1991a). Due to the progress in modeling increasing returns to
scale, the theoretical deadlock of traditional location models was overcome.
NEG models were used by Krugman (1991a), Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables (1999), and by Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman and Venables (2000) to
explain location of overall economic activity, industrial clusters and location
of various manufacturing sectors, respectively.
The NEG stresses the “interaction between transport costs and firm-level
scale economies as a source of agglomeration” (Head and Mayer (2003)).
Furthermore, these are closely related with forward and backward linkages.
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For a better understanding how agglomeration forces work, let us consider a
simple framework with two regions (Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)).
Suppose that at an initial point these regions are asymmetric, that is one
region has more firms and a larger population. The large pool of firms makes
it easier for a firm to find a deliverer for intermediate goods locally. Thus, the
firm saves on transportation costs and lowers the final prices. The increasing
number of firms makes the competition among them more fierce which leads
to a further decline of prices and higher wages. This in turn raises the living
standard and attracts people from the other region. The increase of the labor
force causes lower wages but at the same time enlarges the pool of potential
consumers. Hence, the larger market will lure new firms into the region. In
this way, an agglomeration can form through a process of circular causation.
However, in addition to the centripetal forces described above, also cen-
trifugal forces become visible when analyzing the economics of agglomeration.
The excessive competition in a large region resulting in falling prices of the
final output can cause some firms to settle in a small region. Benefits of
lower competition will offset the disadvantage of a smaller pool of suppliers
and customers.
There are also some alternative explanations of agglomeration and loca-
tion decisions of firms. The most compelling one is known as “first nature”
(Krugman (1993)) and relates to the natural advantage: the physical geog-
raphy of coasts, mountains, and endowments of natural resources. Economic
activity is located over given area according to the dispersion or concentration
of these underlying features. The concept of “first nature” is closely related
to the factor-proportions theory which takes the spatial distribution of re-
sources as exogenous and employs it to explain the geographic distribution
of production.
Another plausible hypothesis is focused on potential external economies
generated by the agglomeration process. At an industry level, firms can
exploit scale economies thanks to the size of the industry at a particular
location. Such externalities modeled by Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and
Romer (1986) arise principally within the same industry. Gains from local-
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ization can result e.g. from technological or knowledge spillovers. Also, a
large specialized labor market is a possible source of externalities. The “hu-
man capital externalities” models, in particular, claim that locations well
endowed with high-skilled workers attract more firms employing these work-
ers (Krugman (1991b)).
All the above listed components imply that the location problem of firms
and industries is not trivial. New aspects emerge when considering the loca-
tion decisions of multinational firms, where one has to distinguish between
horizontal and vertical investments.
As mentioned in the introduction, the first type, horizontal foreign invest-
ment, occurs when it is less costly to serve a foreign market by producing
there than by exports. Theoretical models of horizontal FDI are based on
similar logic as those treating location choices of firms in general. They also
emphasize the importance of transportation costs of serving a group of con-
sumers from a distance, here augmented by tariffs and other barriers to trade,
while at the same time benefiting from concentration of production in one
plant. These transportation costs are then compared with fixed costs that
arise from setting a new plant abroad and with the loss of scale economies
caused by splitting production between two locations (for an example see
Brainard (1993)). Such models imply that horizontal FDI are more likely
to emerge in countries characterized by a large local market that permits to
reap the economies of scale.
The vertical FDI takes place when a multinational firm shifts some or all
of its production to a low-cost location with the output sold in the parent or
third countries. The first models of vertical FDI were proposed by Helpman
(1984, 1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). In the case of vertical
FDI, the theoretical approach is based on the assumption that subsequent
stages of production vary in terms of requirements of production factors.
Therefore, given that factor prices differ between countries, the geographical
fragmentation of production will be beneficial. The international variation of
input prices arises in turn from different factor endowments. Consequently,
in such models the differences in factor endowments between countries have
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to be sufficiently large, so that trade in goods will not lead to factor price
equalization.
Markusen, Venables, Eby-Konan and Zhang (1996) and Markusen (1997)
merges both types of FDI, vertical and horizontal, into one theoretical frame-
work - the Knowledge Capital Model. In this model three types of firms are
distinguished: horizontal FDI, vertical FDI and firms from the home country
that can reach consumers in a foreign country by exports. Results depend
on the relative country characteristics. When the differences between coun-
tries’ endowments are large, then the vertical FDI dominates. At the other
end, where countries are alike and in the presence of transport costs, hor-
izontal FDI will prevail. Between both extremes, the firms’ landscape is
mixed. The implications of this model for the determinants of FDI location
are similar to those of models of horizontal and vertical FDI outlined above.
Horizontal FDI emerges between large, equal countries, whereas vertical FDI
is conducted between countries that differ in factor prices.
Summarizing, the vital location decisions assisting maximization of prof-
its can be based on criteria such as transportation costs, local market size
as well as natural resources and endowments. The agglomeration size also
plays an important role, resulting in counteracting concentration and decen-
tralization processes. Concerning cross-border decisions, two major types of
FDI can be identified: vertical, driven by production costs and consequently
more sensitive to provision of investment incentives by local governments,
and horizontal, mainly influenced by transportation costs and impediments
to trade. The above surveyed theoretical models of FDI consider different
countries as alternative destinations. However, the major differences between
vertical and horizontal FDI are still relevant when considering regions within
one country which are the focus of this chapter.
4.2.2 Survey of Empirical Literature
The location choice of multinational firms has attracted a lot of attention in
the empirical literature. Hence, this short survey is by no means exhaustive.
It aims at addressing the key aspects based upon the evidence from a variety
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of countries. The studies outlined below have been divided into three groups.
The first subsection reviews papers that study FDI location determinants
in developed countries, the second subsection discusses the evidence from
transition countries, while the third subsection deals with export-oriented
investments.
Regarding the estimation techniques, most of the studies presented in
the first two subsections employ discrete choice methodology, in particular
the conditional logit model proposed by McFadden (1974). This framework
assumes that the decision makers’ evaluation of available alternatives may
be represented by a utility function and the decision maker chooses the al-
ternative with the highest utility. In such an empirical model the dependent
variable takes the value one for the site chosen by foreign investor and zero
for all alternative locations. Some papers have also employed a nested version
of the logit model, where the decision process assumes a hierarchical struc-
ture: the decision maker chooses first the nest and then a specific alternative
within this nest. The dependent variables in empirical studies presented in
the last subsection are of continuous nature, therefore they predominantly
use OLS approach.
Developed Countries
Most of the empirical papers in this field deal with the experience of devel-
oped countries. This is partly due to the fact, that FDI flows to developing
and transition countries are a more recent phenomenon, while FDI among de-
veloped countries has a longer tradition. Thus, sufficient data for statistical
analysis could be collected.
The usual procedure in those papers is to focus on one or two aspects of
the location decision, adding other factors that influence the profit function
as controls. Since NEG emerged, a vast number of papers has been dedicated
to identification of the role of agglomeration forces. Another popular topic
is the effectiveness of public incentives in attracting foreign investors.
One example of a study that concentrates on analysis of centripetal forces
is a paper by Guimaraes, Figueiredo, and Woodward (2000) who explore the
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determinants of location of foreign-owned greenfield plants in the urban ar-
eas and outlying regions of Portugal within the period between 1985 and
1992. They identify four types of agglomeration forces: total manufacturing
agglomeration, industry specific agglomeration, foreign specific agglomera-
tion and service agglomeration. Moreover, they control for labor market
characteristics, land costs, distance to two principal urban areas: Porto and
Lisabon, and include dummy variables for these two cities for additional un-
observed urbanization economies. First, their results provide evidence that
agglomeration forces are a determining factor in the location of foreign in-
vestments. Among them, service agglomeration economies apparently have
the strongest effect, followed by industry level economies, while FDI spe-
cific agglomeration appears to be insignificant. Concerning the remaining
variables, they find that higher labor costs actually attract foreign investors
rather than discourage them. Hereupon they argue that wages may also be
interpreted as a proxy for qualifications and skills of the work force. Also land
costs, measured by population density, when significant are positively cor-
related with the probability of new establishments of foreign-owned plants.
Furthermore, as far as major cities are concerned, the probability of location
decreases with distance to them, and their dummies are statistically signifi-
cant. Summarizing, the findings suggest that foreign investors exhibit strong
urban orientation.
Barrios, Görg and Strobl (2003), besides focusing on agglomeration, also
assess the effectiveness of creation of designated areas where multinationals
were offered public grants.2 They examine the case of Ireland and use the
longest data set among all presented in this short survey. They are able
to trace the establishment date, employment and location of virtually all
domestic- and foreign-owned plants that existed in the Irish manufacturing
between 1972 and 1998. For the whole time span they find that location
choices of foreign firms are positively influenced by proximity to other firms
from the same industry and by urban diversity in manufacturing activities.
2The authors note, that these grants vary between different designated areas, as they
arise from bilateral agreements between a particular multinational and public authorities.
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Furthermore, multinationals tend to cluster in the same locations with firms
of the same “nationality” and generally where activities of foreign firms are
more intensive. The distance to a major port or airport is negatively corre-
lated with the probability of location choice.
Regarding labor market characteristics, similarly as Guimaraes,
Figueiredo, and Woodward (2000), Barrios, Görg and Strobl (2003) surpris-
ingly find that high wages attract multinationals. Some additional results
become apparent when the sample is split into high-tech and low-tech in-
dustries. Their findings imply that the regional policy has an effect only
in enhancing low-tech investment. Furthermore, the urbanization economies
are more important for high-tech industries, while clustering within the same
industry is significant only for low-tech industries.
As the study reviewed previously, in addition to agglomeration forces and
determinants of the profit function, Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) in-
clude investment incentives provided by public authorities. They study the
determinants of foreign investors’ location choice over French départements
between 1985 and 1995. The major contribution of this paper is the identifi-
cation of clustering patterns among firms that originate in the same country
and industry. It appears that although on average firms incline to follow the
competitors of the same nationality, there are some substantial differences de-
pending on the country of origin of the investor. In contrast to the previously
presented study, computers, car parts, machine tools and office machinery
exhibit the strongest agglomeration effects within the same industry.
Additionally, the location choice of foreign firms is positively correlated
with local demand, whereas the distance to the home country and local wages
have a negative impact on the attractiveness of a particular region for foreign
investors. Regarding incentive policies, which take the form of labor-related
grants provided by the French government for creating or maintaining jobs in
lagging regions, as well as various grants related to EU’s regional policy, the
authors find a negligible positive effect. Finally, for some European countries
they identify a “learning process” of foreign direct investment, as the FDI
locations gradually become more remote from the country of origin during
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the period they study.
Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) assess the effectiveness of US state pro-
motion efforts in the presence of a strong agglomeration trend in Japanese
investment. Their regressions consider the influence of corporate taxes, la-
bor and capital subsidies as well as foreign trade zones. Along with these
variables, they include covariates measuring agglomeration effects, market
potential and labor market characteristics. Unlike previous studies, their
also control for regional fixed effects. The main conclusion they draw from
their results is that states that offered public incentives received significant
increases in investment. However, since individual state policies were of-
ten adopted by other states, they tended to offset each other, so that their
effect on the spatial distribution of Japanese investment appears small. Ad-
ditionally, the authors find that the magnitude and sign of the coefficients
measuring policy effects are sensitive to the inclusion of the agglomeration
variables and fixed effects.
Concerning results on agglomeration forces, Japanese investments tend
to cluster with other Japanese firms, particularly those in the same 4-digit
industry class or keiretsu.3 Finally, as for labor market variables, they are
also responsive to the inclusion of agglomeration variables and regional fixed
effects. This sensitivity of variables measuring public incentives and labor
costs implies, as the authors note, that the inclusion of detailed agglomer-
ation measures and controls for unobservable factors appears important for
obtaining accurate estimates of policy variables.
Coughlin and Segev (2000) follow a slightly different strategy, as they
assign equal importance to all possible factors that might have an impact
on foreign firms’ decisions. In contrast to previously reviewed studies, they
employ negative binominal regression methodology rather than logit, be-
cause they have the information on the number of foreign-owned plants in
a certain region. The authors show that the location choices of new foreign
plants across the United States for the period of 1989 to 1994 respond to the
3Keiretsu is a Japanese term for a set of companies with interlocking business relation-
ships and shareholdings. It means also a company that has many branches (Wikipedia,
the free encyclopedia).
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majority of variables that might have affected the profitability in the given
location. However, regarding the labor market, unlike previous studies, the
authors use unit labor costs instead of wages. They find that higher unit
labor costs and taxes discourage foreign investment, while the economic size,
labor force quality, agglomeration forces, urbanization economies and trans-
portation infrastructure positively influence the decisions of foreign firms.
Finally, the possibility that climate could affect the choice of foreign firms is
explored, following the reasoning of the “first nature”. This effect, however,
turns out to be statistically insignificant.
Transition Economies
Empirical studies exploring location choices of multinational firms in Central
and Eastern European (CEE) countries started to emerge only recently due
to data limitations.
A paper by Disdier and Mayer (2003) compares the determinants of for-
eign firm location in Western and Eastern Europe on the example of French
multinationals. The empirical evidence presented implies that French firms
first choose the region of investment location, i.e. Western or Eastern Eu-
rope, and then the country within the region, whereupon the determinants of
location choice differ between these two regions. In both, the local demand
is positively correlated with the firms’ choices, but the magnitude of effect is
actually higher in CEE countries. Disdier and Mayer (2003) note that this
fact stands in contrast with the opinion about Eastern Europe being mostly
seen as a host of cost saving, vertical FDI.
On the other hand, agglomeration effects are stronger in Western Eu-
rope. The authors provide two possible explanations. It could be the case
that competition tends to be stronger in CEE countries or that the French
firms in Eastern Europe heavily depend on intermediaries produced in France
or Western Europe. Distance to France is a further source of differences be-
tween these two groups of countries. Its negative impact is more pronounced
in Eastern Europe and interpreted as evidence of higher transaction costs.
Moreover, the average wages have a stronger negative influence on location
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decisions in CEE countries than in Western Europe revealing a higher sen-
sitivity to production costs in the former. Additionally, Disdier and Mayer
(2003) include variables measuring the quality of the institutional framework
in the estimating equation. This yields rather mixed results with the coef-
ficient on cumulative liberalization index being even negative. Finally, they
are able to measure the gap between Eastern and Western Europe in the
opinion of French investors and show that this gap decreases over time.
Using a data set comprising Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and Roma-
nian regions Pusterla and Resmini (2005) investigate the location choice of
foreign firms between 1995 and 2001. First, they show that for foreign in-
vestors “Hungarian and Polish regions are more similar to each other than to
Bulgarian and Romanian regions”. They argue, that this result implies that
Hungary and Poland compete for foreign investment with countries belonging
to the European Union rather than with Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover,
the authors confirm the importance of agglomeration forces that are mainly
FDI specific. Their results also indicate that the probability that a multi-
national locates in a transition country is mainly driven by cost advantages.
However, in contrast to the previous study, they do not directly examine the
hypothesis of market potential influence.
For Hungary, Békés (2004) considers questions related to agglomeration
effects, market potential and input-output linkages using data on newly es-
tablished foreign-owned plants. On the supply side he distinguishes between
local supplier access, local raw material access and local business services ac-
cess. The market potential is measured by consumer income, size of county
and national market access. The results suggest that even in the case of a
relatively small country like Hungary, the market potential - both local and
non-local - plays an important role for location decisions of foreign firms.
Among variables measuring input linkages, only local supplier access has a
positive and statistically significant impact on the location decision. Because
of the country’s size, the production sector in Hungary relies heavily on im-
ports, for the same reason a large part of its output is exported. In order
to account for the proximity to export and import markets, Békés (2004)
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includes the distance from “the key western external border”. He treats this
variable as an additional measure for upstream as well as downstream link-
ages. The coefficient on distance takes the expected negative sign. Finally,
after various measures of wages have been tested, the author finds that lower
industry specific wages are conducive to FDI.
In a very recent paper Hilber and Voicu (2005), focusing on greenfield
plants, examine different types of agglomeration and labor market effects on
the example of regions in Romania. Due to data limitations, they cannot
use a logit approach and following Coughlin and Segev (2000) employ nega-
tive binominal regression. The authors’ findings show that industry specific
foreign agglomeration as well as service agglomeration forces are conducive
to foreign investments. Like Head, Ries and Swenson (1998), they add fixed
regional effects which turn out to have expected signs in their estimating
equation. The results reveal that including fixed effects augments and ren-
ders the coefficients on labor market variables statistically significant. The
estimates obtained from the regression with fixed effects confirm the theo-
retical prediction for wages that increases in labor costs decrease a region’s
attractiveness to FDI.
Using data on Japanese multinationals, Cieślik and Ryan (2005) focus on
Polish regions. In their paper they try to assess the effectiveness of public
investment incentives (in form of special economic zones (SEZs) provided by
the government in a few regions) in attracting foreign firms. Regarding the
estimation methodology, again, they have data on the number of Japanese
FDI, but not on when the activity began, so they use a negative binominal
regression in place of conditional logit. Their results are somewhat differ-
ent from the main stream of empirical literature, showing that GDP as the
measure of size and wealthiness of the region loses its significance when they
control for “the center-periphery” pattern with shares of industry and ser-
vices in local employment. Among agglomeration forces, included in their
estimation, only the industry specific one appears to have an impact on for-
eign investment. Furthermore, like in many other studies, high wages seem to
attract foreign investors also in Poland. However, as in the case of GDP, this
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effect is no longer significant when variables measuring centrifugal and cen-
tripetal forces are included. Concerning SEZs, although they are positively
correlated with the Japanese FDI, the result is not significant in majority of
specifications.
Finally, in their paper about foreign ventures in China’s cities, Head
and Ries (1996) explore agglomeration externalities and the role of incen-
tives provided to attract FDI. Their sample comprises manufacturing invest-
ments coming primarily from the US and Japan. Along with tax exemptions,
Chinese cities offered also “import duty reductions, reduced land user fees,
elimination of red-tape, and relaxed rules on labor management” to foreign
investors. The authors find these incentives make a city more attractive to
investors. However, as in the case of Japanese investment in the US reviewed
above, agglomeration effects magnify the impact of local incentives. The re-
sults also show, that foreign investors are not only likely to settle near other
foreign investors, but also cluster with domestic enterprises. Furthermore,
they prefer cities with a high concentration of industrial production. That
is, foreign investors are drawn to areas which have a large existing pool of
potential input suppliers. Industrial wages and industrial productivity, also
included in the regression, have little influence on the pattern of investment,
while the infrastructure facilitating exports is conducive to foreign invest-
ments.
Export-oriented FDI
While in both above subsections most papers investigate determinants of
location choice of MNEs originating from different countries among regions
of single host country, there exists no study that would explore the decision
logic of export-oriented FDI within one country. Here I am presenting a few
examples of studies that, with the exception of Woodward and Rolfe (1993),
use a broader sample of countries receiving investments from just one or
two countries. Empirical papers covered by this paragraph can be split into
two groups. First two studies, by Kumar (1994) and Woodward and Rolfe
(1993), follow the tradition of location theory, while the remaining two are
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closely related to theories of horizontal and vertical FDI. At the beginning
of this section I mentioned, that papers reviewed in this paragraph employ
OLS rather than logit methodology, the most popular one among location
choice studies. This is because in the real world a clear distinction between
firms producing solely for exports and their counterparts selling exclusively
on the local market is not always possible. Thus, the dependent variable in
the case of vertical FDI is rather measured directly by exports or share of
exports in total sales of MNE’s foreign affiliates.
One study from the first group done by Kumar (1994) investigates the
inter-country pattern of export-oriented production by US multinationals in
1982 across industrialized as well as developing countries. His empirical find-
ings imply that low-wage countries rich in raw materials attract this type of
investment. Also countries with a well established industrial infrastructure
enjoy the advantage over others. Furthermore, he shows that export process-
ing zones, equipped with a more efficient infrastructure, port facilities and
tax and custom privileges, have managed to entice export-oriented FDI.
Woodward and Rolfe (1993) analyze the determinants of country selection
in direct investment cases in the Caribbean Basin. They find that the proba-
bility of country selection varies inversely with wage rates and increases with
quality of infrastructure, size of export processing zones and length of tax
holidays. Furthermore, GDP per capita appears to attract export-oriented
multinationals. The latter result is not very intuitive, as this variable is usu-
ally associated with the effect related to market potential. Authors argue
that in the case of export-oriented FDI, it may reflect the provision of vari-
ous kinds of infrastructure necessary for export-related activities rather than
local market conditions.
Regarding the second group of studies, determinants of vertical versus
horizontal investments are explored as a byproduct of empirical testing of
the underlying theoretical models.
For example, Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002) use data on US and
Swedish multinationals in 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998. Different types of ver-
tical FDI, and horizontal FDI for comparison, are then regressed on home
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and host country characteristics.4 In particular they include GDP of the
home and host country, the distance between them, relative wage premium,
investment costs and trade barriers. Their main result is that foreign firms’
affiliates’ exports to home and third countries as well as imports from the
parent country are positively influenced by the relative wage premium of the
host to the home country. This result suggests that vertical FDI is larger in
host countries with high skill premia, that is countries with relatively cheap
unskilled labor.5 The latter corroborates the theoretical implications that
vertical FDI is a cost saving FDI. Regarding other results, both GDP mea-
sures correlate positively with vertical FDI, where the effect of the home
country is much stronger. Unfortunately, the authors do not give any ex-
planation why the size of the host country should have a positive impact
on the exports. Finally, the distance to the home country, investment costs
and trade barriers have the expected negative signs, with the trade barriers’
coefficient being insignificant.
In another study, Slaughter (2003) compares the determinants of US FDI
in Europe in various industrial sectors and with different external orienta-
tion. As opposed to Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002), whose dependent
variables enter the regression in levels, Slaughter (2003) compares how the
result changes if one uses variables expressed as respective shares. He argues,
that regressands in absolute levels deliver little information about the option
facing affiliates, that is to export or sell into the host market, and such a
regression simply confirms that foreign firms in certain types of countries
“do more of everything: exporting, and selling in all industries”. So that,
4They estimate a log-linear gravity equation and the Knowledge Capital Model, where
the home market effect is also considered. This is because the larger the home country,
the more home-based MNEs will emerge, and consequently, the more affiliates abroad will
arise. Additionally, a larger home country means a higher demand for affiliates’ exports.
5More precisely, the elasticities of the three listed variables with respect to relative
wage premium are of different magnitude in their analysis. Since the main goal of their
paper is to test the validity of theory of vertical FDI, the estimated elasticities provide
the information of “how vertical” these activities really are. This relates to the discussion
that takes place in the economic literature on how vertical FDI should be measured.
Nevertheless, the results of Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002) suggest that affiliates
exporting to home and third countries, as well as affiliates that draw inputs from the
parent country all can be viewed as vertical FDI, as they are sensitive to differences in
factor prices between the parent and receiving country, to a different extent however.
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he shows, when using the share of exports6 in foreign firms’ affiliates’ sales,
the GDP of the host country has a negative impact, while in the case of
levels its effect is positive. The first result implies that in smaller countries
foreign firms aim at export more than local sales. In contrast, the coefficient
on GDP per capita is positive in both regressions indicating that in more
productive countries sales are directed toward export. Corporate taxes have
a negative impact in both cases, as could be expected, since higher taxes
diminish profit.
Summary of the Main Findings of Empirical Literature
The empirical evidence concerning some of determinants of foreign firms’
activities is uniform and in line with theoretical predictions, while in the
case of other elements of location decision it is mixed, as the overview in
Table 4.1 highlights.
For example, it has been well documented in the empirical literature
that agglomeration forces in general do matter for the location choice of
MNEs. In particular, foreign affiliates tend to cluster in sites with a high
density of other foreign firms. Among them, firms of the same nationality
are likely to settle close to one another, however, this effect depends on the
country of origin. It has been also shown, that industry specific externalities
are important. Additionally, a number of papers identify a positive effect
of urbanization economies. Furthermore, the demand potential appears to
have substantially contributed to location choices of FDI in general, while
the effect on export-oriented FDI is uncertain.
Turning to the cost side of the profit function, variables that proxy for
transportation costs, like vicinity of the home country and various measures
of the quality or availability of infrastructure, have a positive influence on
the location choices of MNEs. As far as labor costs are concerned, export-
oriented FDI exhibit a clearly negative correlation. In studies where no
distinction between the geographical destination of sales was made, however,
the outcome is not so clear. In many location decision studies the wages’
6Slaughter (2003) does not distinguish between exports to parent country and to third
countries.
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coefficients exhibit the expected negative sign, on the other hand, in many
others they take a positive value. Two explanations have been proposed for
the latter result. First, instead of treating wages as a cost factor, they can
be interpreted as a signal of quality of labor force, or the quality of location
more generally. Second, in the case of regional setting, wages may well be
a determinant of the decision to locate in particular country as opposed to
other countries, but not a part of the decision to select a certain area within
this country.
Last but not least, some studies have investigated the effectiveness of
public policies like taxation or state support. While in most cases lower
taxes and investments costs plus various incentives attract MNEs, in two
cases the effect of this variables was negligible. Furthermore, in two papers
it is pointed out, that agglomeration forces in general considerably augment
the effectiveness of such policies.
Finally, it appears that determinants of location of foreign affiliates
in transition countries are becoming more similar to those in developed
economies. That is, even though MNEs in transition economies are still
more sensitive to labor costs, in some countries, more advanced in transition
like Poland and Hungary, they are also interested in local demand.
4.3 Background on Regional Development
in Poland
After the collapse of the socialist regime Poland underwent substantial
changes. Before I move on to the econometric results, it is useful to pro-
vide some knowledge regarding the spatial development during transition in
Poland. The important question is: was this development equal for all re-
gions? This section presents a description of the spatial pattern of changes
that occurred during transformation. In particular, the regional development
of variables related to the empirical analysis such as geographical distribu-
tion of foreign firms’ activities, GDP and GDP per capita, average wages and
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unit labor costs are reported.
After a close inspection of the pattern of regional development in Poland
today one cannot help the impression that it is still, at least to some extent,
shaped by the historical heritage. The contemporary condition of regional
economies and their ability to meet the requirements of a global economy
seem to be stamped by the legacy of the 19th century. In 1795, Poland was
divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria and disappeared from the map
of Europe as an independent country. This deep-rooted division is still visible
on the map of Poland.7
Neither the shift of the Polish borders after the Second World War, nor
the years of the planning economy changed the pattern. Poland is still divided
into the better developed western part, extended in the south and the north-
eastern one that is lagging behind.
Among the leaders of Polish transformation there are regions with
great agglomerations of Warsaw (Mazowieckie voivodship), Poznań
(Wielkopolskie), Wroc law (Dolnoślaskie), Gdansk (Pomorskie) and Cracow
(Ma lopolskie). These agglomerations became strong economic, cultural, sci-
entific and academic centers. Attracting high levels of investment, they were
able to boost the economy of their regions as a whole. With the notable ex-
ception of Warsaw, they are situated in the western and southern parts of the
country. Regarding the Mazowieckie voivodship, although centrally located
it holds clearly the dominant position benefiting from being the political
center of Poland.
At the other end of the development scale we find a group of rural regions
in Eastern Poland: Podlaskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, and Świetokrzyskie.
These voivodships are characterized by low population density, a relatively
high share of agriculture in economic activities and poor infrastructure. In
addition, the comparatively unfavorable geographical location of these re-
7Yet another territorial change took place in 1831, when the Tsar of Russia annexed
the Congress Kingdom of Poland (dependent from Russia state, which was created at the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 following the Napoleonic wars). Poland, after being absent
from the map of Europe for 123 years, regained its independence first in 1918. For the
interested reader Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the detailed division of Polish territory between
its three neighbors from 1831 to 1917 and for comparison its geographical position today.
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gions (proximity to economically less developed Belarus, Ukraine and Rus-
sia) limits the opportunities for fruitful trans-border cooperation and joint
economic activities. It comes as no surprise that they could not benefit from
the transformation to the same extent as the more developed regions.
Although this pattern of development seems to have remained stable in
the course of transition, there were some changes in the economic map of
Poland. Along with economic transition, regional and social disparities in
Poland became increasingly evident. The next subsections will look at some
indicators of regional development in greater detail.
4.3.1 GDP and GDP per Capita
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of GDP among Polish regions at two points
in time: 1995 and 2002. It illustrates two main facts. First, the general
pattern of GDP distribution did not change between 1995 and 2002. In
1995 as well as in 2002 Mazowieckie, Ślaskie, Wielkopolskie and Dolnoślaskie
voivodships were the economically strongest regions, together contributing to
about 49 percent of the Polish GDP. The four regions that ranked last also
remained unchanged. These regions make up about 11 percent of the Polish
GDP. On the other hand, the disparities have grown over time. Looking
at the box-plots presented in Figure 4.1, we can see that it was the regions
above the median that contributed to a growing dispersion.
Additionally, in 2002 compared to 1995 there is a change in outliers,
mainly due to outstanding growth of GDP in Mazowieckie. Ślaskie, although
it did not lose its relatively high position (it ranked second in 2002 as well
as in 1995), is most often referred to as a region that has been most ad-
versely affected by the process of economic transition. Being a traditional
industrial core of Poland, it was the focus of planned development, and to
a large extent, the driver of economic activity. During the transformation
period, the region was severely influenced by the reorientation of trade away
from formerly secure markets and by the reduction of subsidies. Apart from
restructuring problems, the Ślaskie Voivodship is characterized by severe de-
generation of the environment inherited from the scale and poor technology
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Figure 4.1: Regional GDP in Poland in 1995 and 2002
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Figure 4.2: Regional GDP per Capita in Poland in 1995 and 2002
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of former industrial production.
The growing disproportion between regions is even better illustrated in
Figure 4.2, where I present the spatial distribution of GDP per capita. In the
years 1995 - 2002 voivodships characterized by a high share in gross domestic
product were in general also characterized by a high level of GDP per capita.
Among leaders, between 1995 and 2002 only Zachodniopomorskie lost its
relatively high rank and was surpassed by Wielkopolskie. In 1995 and in
2002 the highest level of GDP per capita was recorded in Mazowieckie, at
119 percent of the national average in 1995 and nearing 160 percent in 2002.
While in the beginning of the examined period Ślaskie, ranked second, was
only slightly behind Mazowieckie with 117 percent of the national average, in
2002 it was far behind - with only 110 percent. The dominant position of Ma-
zowieckie in 2002 is clearly depicted by the lower box-plot in Figure 4.2. The
disparities between remaining 12 voivodships did not change substantially.
Concerning GDP per capita, the lagging regions of Warmińsko-mazurskie,
Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie achieved between 75 and 80 percent
of the national average in 1995 and between 70 and 77 percent in 2002.
4.3.2 Employment Structure
The Polish employment is gradually evolving into a structure typical for other
EU countries. Particularly, there has been a reduction of the share of indus-
try as well as agriculture in favor of employment in services. In 1995 the
share of agriculture in Polish employment was almost 23 percent, but over
the next eight years it dropped by 26 percent down to 18 percent. Despite
this rapid decline, the share of agriculture in the Polish employment remains
much higher compared to other European countries. In the same period, the
share of industry and construction in employment fell from 32 to 29 percent,
whereas the share of employment in services increased from 45 to 53 percent.
Figure 4.3 shows the employment breakdown across regions. The following
picture emerges from this figure: as depicted by the green bars, the share of
agriculture in employment was higher in the eastern part of Poland in 1995
as well as in 2003. In particular Lubelskie, Podlaskie, Świetokrzyskie and
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Figure 4.3: Employment by Kinds of Activity in Polish Regions in 1995 and
2003
101
Podkarpackie remained the most rural Polish areas. Among other voivod-
ships with a relatively high share of agricultural employment Warmińsko-
mazurskie and Ma lopolskie have managed to reduce it substantially. In
1995 these voivodships had about the same share of employment in industry
and agriculture, while in 2003, the shares of these sectors declined in favor
of services. The most industrialized regions are predominantly situated in
the western part, with the exception of centrally located  Lódzkie, while the
most service-oriented voivodships are Mazowieckie, Lubuskie, Zachodniopo-
morskie, Pomorskie and Warmińsko-mazurskie. The last three, situated on
the coast and in the Masurian Lake District, are benefiting from their natural
advantage, as the increase in their service sector is to a large extent due to
the booming tourism sector. The dynamic growth of the service sector in
western voivodships is also related to the proximity to Germany thanks to a
relatively large price gap.
4.3.3 Labor Costs and Infrastructure
As the theory suggests, one of the determinants of location of foreign affili-
ates of MNEs, in particular vertical FDI, are labor costs. Figure 4.4 presents
the regional wage differentials in Poland. The striking feature of this figure
is the fact that it closely resembles the one depicting GDP per capita. Only
Kujawsko-pomorskie brakes the pattern, characterized by a relatively large
GDP per capita and relatively low wages. This is actually in line with predic-
tions of NEG. In Section 4.2.1 it is pointed out, that regions that concentrate
a lot of economic activities will be characterized by higher wages, because
firms in those regions have to compete for labor force. Figure 4.4 also shows
that measuring labor costs with wages might be inappropriate, since regions
with higher wages are also characterized by higher productivity. Therefore
it is more reasonable to look at unit labor costs, since this measure incor-
porates wages as well as productivity. Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution
of unit labor costs in Poland: the further east we go, the more expensive
labor becomes. A similar result arises from Table 4.11, which provides de-
tailed information about the development of infrastructure in Poland. The
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Figure 4.4: Average Wages across Polish Regions in 1995 and 2003
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Figure 4.5: Unit Labor Costs across Polish Regions in 1995 and 2002
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upper part of this table shows key characteristics for the year 1995, while the
lower part those for the year 2003. It appears that compared to western and
south-western regions, the eastern ones, with the exception of Mazowieckie,
have mainly poor infrastructure.8 This pattern seems to persist over time
as well. Four eastern regions: Warmińsko-mazurskie, Podlaskie, Lubelskie
and Podkarpackie occupy the last places at the beginning and the end of the
examined period.
4.3.4 Foreign Investors
Next, we turn to the regional distribution of activities of foreign firms in
Poland. Among Polish voivodships, Mazowieckie and more specifically War-
saw and its surroundings, is by all means the most favored location for foreign
investment, as in 2003 it concentrated almost 32 percent of all companies
with foreign capital participation. Other high concentrations of foreign in-
vestors are found in urban areas in Dolnoślaskie, Wielkopolskie and Ślaskie.
These three regions together accumulated further 30 percent of firms with
foreign participation. However, assuming other determinants away, it seems
obvious that larger, more populated voivodships will automatically host a
larger number of firms, be it domestic or foreign. For that reason, Figure
4.6 shows the spatial distribution of foreign activities in Poland in terms of
their share in local employment. Between 1996 and 2003 only Pomorskie left
the very top to be replaced by Dolnoślaskie. Also Ślaskie and Warmińsko-
mazurskie gained, displacing Kujawsko-pomorskie and  Lódzkie. All in all,
foreign activities in Poland are skewed to the west.
Now, let us consider only export-oriented or vertical FDI. Again, if we
examine export of foreign affiliates in levels, we will find that it concentrates
in voivodships that in general accumulate the majority of foreign activi-
ties. If we, however, look at the share of exports in foreign firms’ revenues,
the emerging spatial distribution is quite different as Figure 4.7 illustrates.
It appears that the geographical pattern of foreign affiliates whose major-
ity of sales is exported is more dispersed compared to the spatial compo-
8For classification details, refer to Section 4.4.
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Figure 4.6: Shares of Employment in Foreign Firms in Total Employment in
Polish Regions in 1996 and 2003
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Figure 4.7: Shares of Exports in Foreign Firms’ Revenues in Polish Regions
in 1996 and 2003
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sition of overall FDI activities. The largest share of exports in 2003 was
recorded in Lubuskie voivodship - 54 percent compared to 33 percent in 1996.
Furthermore, Dolnoślaskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie and Podkarpackie exhibit
shares of over 40 percent, while Mazowieckie, Malopolskie, Świetokrzyskie
and Wielkopolskie constitute the bottom group with shares ranging from 9
to 24 percent. In other words, vertical FDI have clearly different determi-
nants than the horizontal ones, as they operate not only in the west of the
country but also choose eastern locations.
Regarding the sectoral distribution of FDI (measured by employment in
foreign affiliates) in all voivodships except Mazowieckie, the bulk of FDI tar-
gets manufacturing, accounting for 30 to 93 percent.9 As Table 4.2 shows in
2002 the highest share of manufacturing was recorded in Podkarpackie and
Warmińsko-mazurskie - about 93 percent, followed by Podlaskie, Kujawsko-
pomorskie, Lubuskie and Opolskie with more than 80 percent, while in Ma-
zowieckie this sector accounted only for 30 percent. This particular voivod-
ship exhibits high shares of wholesale and retail trade and repair (28 percent),
transport and telecommunications (18 percent) as well as business activities
(9 percent). Furthermore, foreign affiliates from the trade sector appear to
be heavily concentrated in Ma lopolskie and exhibit strong presence in other
voivodships with big agglomerations. Also foreign firms operating in the
business activities sector prefer locations with large urban areas.
Table 4.3 shifts the focus from the sectoral distribution of FDI to the
composition according to the country of origin. For every voivodship it re-
ports shares of certain countries in total foreign equity. One notable feature
of this table is that the distribution of FDI in most voivodships is concen-
trated around one, two or three countries. Ma lopolskie constitutes an ex-
treme example where as much as 75 percent of total foreign equity is owned
by Holland. Germany, with a share of about 30 - 40 percent, is strongly
represented in virtually all western voivodships, while its shares are getting
9However, data published by the Polish Statistical Office (PSO) do not comprise FDI in
banking and insurance. According to Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency
(PAIiIZ) investment in those sectors accounts for about 20 percent of all FDI, see Chapter
1. Since I have no information about geographical distribution of activities in banking and
insurance, I refer here to the rest as a 100 percent.
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śl
as
ki
e
65
.0
2.
9
1.
7
12
.6
6.
1
0.
8
4.
0
6.
8
K
uj
aw
sk
o-
po
m
or
sk
ie
88
.7
2.
2
6.
3
0.
1
0.
3
1.
7
0.
6
L
ub
el
sk
ie
72
.4
2.
5
16
.4
0.
1
2.
4
1.
4
4.
8
L
ub
us
ki
e
84
.3
0.
8
1.
5
4.
3
0.
6
3.
8
2.
0
2.
7
 L
ód
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smaller when moving east. Among western voivodships only in Lubuskie
Germany accounts for less than 20 percent of the whole foreign equity. This
voivodship appears to have the most heterogeneous population of foreign
firms, with Sweden as the largest investor. In general Holland and Germany
are present in all regions with the smallest share at about 10 percent. In Ma-
zowieckie France is the biggest shareholder with 30 percent, probably thanks
to investment of France Télécom in the Polish telecommunications sector
(this investment is also visible in Table 4.2). Furthermore, France is also
the second largest investor in Podlaskie, where it accounts for 29 percent.
Regarding US, it is represented with 18 percent share in Podkarpackie and
10 percent shares in Mazowieckie and Opolskie. The last column of Table 4.3
reports the rest of the foreign equity. Unfortunately, the PSO does not pub-
lish detailed distributions of foreign investors in Polish voivodships, which
is a source of serious uncertainty about the origin of invested capital in the
case of Podkarpackie, as “other” accounts for as much as 37 percent. A short
investigation reveals that the bulk of those 37 percent can be attributed to
Cyprus.
This sizable cross-voivodship variation in foreign affiliate industry and
country composition contradicts the idea that all FDI into Poland are driven
by the same forces and are thus likely to look the same across regions. In-
stead, it suggests that MNEs base their establishment decisions on a set of
location characteristics, that will be addressed econometrically in next sec-
tions.
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4.4 Estimation and Data
4.4.1 Estimation Strategy
To examine the influence of regional characteristics on the extent of foreign
firms’ activity I estimate the following equation:
FORACTjt = βZjt−1 + λj + θt + ujt (4.1)
where FORACTjt denotes foreign activity in region j in the year t, Z is
defined as a vector of regional characteristics and λ and θ are fixed regional
and time effects, respectively.
The activities of foreign investors (generally represented by FORACT )
are measured by three variables. First, I employ the share of employment in
foreign firms in total employment (EMPFOR) to cover the entire FDI activ-
ity. Second, I use a share of exports in foreign firms’ revenues (EXPFOR)
in order to make a distinction between FDI directed toward serving exter-
nal markets (vertical) and the one supplying the local market (horizontal),
measured by LOCFOR complementary to EXPFOR.10
Dependent variables measured in shares instead of levels imply, that ag-
glomeration forces or other unobserved variables in the same way affecting
domestic and foreign activities, or export-related and local market-oriented
sales of foreign firms, are deflated. In particular, EMPFOR captures the
impact of regional characteristics on foreign activities only, as the dependent
variable implicitly controls for unobserved variables that affect foreign as well
as domestic activity. EXPFOR and LOCFOR examine solely what impact
the regional characteristics have on export and local sales, respectively, when
unobserved effects that influence FDI in general are excluded because of the
form of dependent variable.
There are important reasons for such an approach. First, I do not have
enough data to measure agglomeration in a direct way, as proposed by em-
pirical literature. Second, there exists abundant literature on agglomeration
forces, and virtually every study finds them to be conducive to FDI. The
10For definitions of vertical and horizontal FDI see the next section.
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significance of centripetal forces is already clearly visible in a descriptive
analysis of regional pattern of development in Poland presented in Section
4.3. Last but not least, in context of sparsely populated, lagging regions, it
is important to look beyond agglomeration forces, in order to identify what
else is driving the decisions of foreign firms. Otherwise, the results would
be dominated by regions where the intensity of economic activity is already
very high.
When using data scaled to two shares, one important aspect must be
taken into account. In the case of EXPFOR and LOCFOR, these shares
will always return one and as a consequence both regressions behave like a
seemingly unrelated system, with the constraint imposed that the coefficient
estimates for each regressor sum to zero. The signs of the coefficient estimates
will be determined by the dominant addend - its share will have coefficients
of the same signs as in the case, where the regression is performed for it as
an unscaled dependent variable.
The dominating addend will be the one exhibiting a higher dependence
on the independent variables. Thus, if such imbalance is given, the share
approach can be used to determine the sign of dependencies for the domi-
nant component, but in order to determine the dependencies of the subor-
dinate component, other normalization methods must be employed. There-
fore, in order to check the robustness of estimated coefficients, I perform
additional regressions where EXPFOR and LOCFOR are replaced by
EXPFOR/PROD and LOCFOR/PROD, generated by normalizing the
export and local sales of foreign firms to global regional production. This
way, we still control for unobserved effects such as agglomeration forces,
which influence both the domestic and foreign activity.
Following the previous empirical studies on horizontal and vertical FDI,
I estimate equation (4.1) with OLS. Since it is unlikely that the included
explanatory variables will capture all regional characteristics that influence
the extent of foreign activities at a particular location, my empirical equa-
tion also includes unit fixed effects. For example, it is likely that some local
governments are more active in promoting their regions or some locations are
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more attractive because of natural advantage than others.11 The inclusion of
voivodship specific fixed effects should alleviate the omitted variables prob-
lem. Consequently, in order to be able to include time invariant variables
together with fixed voivodships effects in one regression, I have to multiply
them by the time trend.
Additionally, I also add fixed time effects because government policies in
general, not only on voivodship level, may affect the attractiveness of par-
ticular regions more than others. For instance, it has been widely criticized
that promotion for investors conducted by the Polish institutions was focused
on such assets as the volume of the domestic market, its strategic location
and economic growth. Such an approach was conducive to an inflow of in-
vestment maintaining a non-innovative type of economy or based solely on
exploitation of its extensive features. To make it more obvious, it is clear
that huge supermarket chains like: Geant and REWE have different location
criteria than Intel Corporation or Infineon Technologies.
All independent variables are included in lags, in order to avoid simul-
taneity. Additionally, lagging all independent variables by one period has
helped to augment the number of observations. That is because all variables
which are generated by national accounts, e.g. GDP, GDP per capita and
global production used for unit labor cost calculation are available only till
2002, while variables related to foreign firms activities have been reported
only since 1996. In other words, thanks to the lagging procedure I could use
all the available information.
4.4.2 Remarks on Definition of Vertical and
Horizontal FDI
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the empirical distinction between horizontal
and vertical FDI is not always possible. This is because there are some
11In 1998 the act of regional self-government was adopted, according to which program-
ming of regional policies is under the responsibility of regional parliaments and voivodships’
Marshalls. In order to receive funding from the state budget, Voivodship Boards apply
for funds, stating the objectives and tasks to be covered by the support, as well as sources
and amounts of finance for the tasks.
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foreign firms that are cost-saving and market-seeking at the same time, as
well as there exist foreign affiliates that sell locally and also export.
In the empirical literature related to this subject, there is a discussion
about the scope of vertical FDI. Braconier, Norbäck and Urban (2002) pro-
pose four basic activities that could help empirically separate vertical from
horizontal FDI: exports to parent country, exports to third countries, local
sales and imports from the home country. The first kind of these activities is
called “pure” vertical FDI, while the export-oriented FDI aimed at serving
a third market is called an “export-platform FDI” with the indication that
this type of activity should be referred to as a vertical linkage, just as the
imports from the parent country. Local sales are rather of horizontal nature,
although to some extent they could comprise also vertical linkages in form
of import from home country.
Marin (2004) is able to directly identify those vertical linkages between
the parent firm and the foreign affiliate. She measures the extent of vertical
activity by intra-firm trade: parent firm exports of intermediates and imports
of inputs or final goods from a foreign affiliate to the parent firm. However,
for the purpose of this study, this definition is not applicable, since my data
do not contain the information about the geographical destination of exports
by multinationals in Poland.
Protsenko (2003) and Hauser (2005) use a more simple, and from the point
of view of this study more useful, distinction between horizontal and vertical
FDI. For firm level data, they declare a foreign affiliate as vertical FDI if it
is exporting more than 50 percent of its output. Otherwise an investment
is called horizontal. As noted above, data collected for the purpose of this
study allows me to discriminate between local foreign firms’ sales and their
export. Following the approach of Protsenko (2003) and Hauser (2005), I use
local sales to define horizontal FDI, and sales on export for vertical FDI.
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4.4.3 Explanatory Variables
The choice of right hand side variables Z in this chapter is inspired by the
empirical literature related to location choice presented in Section 4.2.2. The
extent of foreign activities in a specific region depends on the levels of this
region’s characteristics relative to other alternative locations. These vari-
ables can be categorized into those affecting the revenue prospects and those
governing the costs of doing business.
On the cost side, first I include unit labor costs (ULC) instead of av-
erage wages. The apparent popularity of wages among researchers can be
explained by the fact that the theoretical prediction of their influence is
straightforward: higher wages increase costs, thus, they are negatively cor-
related with the magnitude of foreign activities. The empirical evidence
reviewed in Section 4.2.2 shows however, that results regarding the sign of
the wage coefficient are mixed. Because of these conflicting results and un-
certainty of what average wage actually measures, I have decided to use unit
labor costs in place of wages. The variable ULC is defined as the annual
average wage divided by the productivity. Productivity in turn is measured
by overall global production divided by average employment.
Furthermore, the host region’s labor supply may have an impact on for-
eign firms’ location decisions through the quality of the labor force. This
invokes one of the so called “Marshallian” externalities: MNEs choose to es-
tablish their affiliates in certain areas because there they will be more likely
to find the labor force with the specific skills they require. Coughlin and
Segev (2000) obtained the results indicating that the measure of quality of
labor force based on education level is an important determinant of location
of new plants. Thus, I have incorporated the percentage of population having
at least a secondary degree (POPEDU/POP ) as an independent variable
in my estimation equation.
Congestion costs, inevitable in agglomeration areas, represent another
potential location determinant on the cost side of the profit function. Higher
land and housing costs, higher service costs or pollution will likely daunt firms
from locating in a specific region. Unfortunately, the information about real
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estate prices, which could be a good proxy for congestion costs, was available
only for 2001 and 2002. Thus, I use the population density as a proxy
(POPDENS). The rationale here is that population density likely reflects
congestion costs because already established residents and commercial users
compete for local capacities. Two of the above reviewed studies, Figueiredo,
Guimaraes and Woodward (2000) and Pusterla and Resmini (2005), follow
this strategy but obtain a positive estimate on population density. The
latter result is in line with an alternative interpretation of this variable as
the one capturing urbanization or the proximity of customers. That way, the
expected sign of this variable will depend on the type of FDI: positive for
horizontal and negative for vertical investment.
As emphasized in Section 4.2.1, firms consider also transportation costs.
They can be proxied by the public infrastructure quality, according to the
rule that better infrastructure results in better accessibility and therefore,
transport of raw materials, intermediaries and final products to and from
their respective markets should be easier and less costly. I measure infras-
tructure endowment using three indicators. Two simple indicators of the
infrastructure quality in a region are the length of railways and the length
of roads per 100 square km. Additionally, I include the development of the
telephone network as an indicator of convenience and frequency of business
and social contacts in a particular region, measured by the number of tele-
phones per 1000 inhabitants. These three indicators are used to classify
voivodships according to the quality of their infrastructure. Using a Borda
electoral count, the sum of the three ranks establishes the overall score for
each region. Thus, the highest possible score is 3, when a region is always
ranked first, and the lowest possible score is 48. Table 4.11 provides detailed
background data of every criterion used for construction of the final measure
of the regional infrastructure development INFRAST . The expected sign
of INFRAST coefficient will be negative, since the smallest score means the
most developed infrastructure.
To control for distance-dependent transportation costs, I have incorpo-
rated the distance to the nearest border crossing with Germany or Austria
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(DISTEU) and the distance from Warsaw (DISTCAP ). The former vari-
able is a good proxy of transportation costs in the case of export-oriented
FDI that seeks to serve the “old” EU market and for foreign firms that rely
on intermediaries imported from the EU.
Alternatively, as Disdier and Mayer (2003) argue, distance can be seen
as a proxy of transaction costs. In this context one could think of infor-
mation costs which are related to the distance from headquarters (about 70
percent of FDI in Poland originate in Western Europe) or language barrier.
Regarding the latter, language skills of local population could be an impor-
tant determinant for foreign firms to locate in particular area. The Polish
General Social Survey (PGSS) reveals that the western and south-western
regions enjoy an advantage over the rest in this respect. DISTEU can cap-
ture these both aspects and is defined as the road distance between the main
city in the region and nearest major border crossing with the “old” Europe.
The reason to include DISTCAP , defined as the distance from Warsaw,
is straightforward. In Poland, a significant part of the economic activity is
concentrated in Warsaw and its surroundings and as the descriptive analysis
in the previous section showed, Mazowieckie voivodship has the largest local
market and the wealthiest population. It also has a “capital bonus” - the
proximity to the place where all decisions are taken.12
On the revenue side, the most important factor affecting the desirability
of undertaking economic activity in a specific location is the demand for the
firm’s good. I measure the potential demand of regions using two variables,
GDP and GDP per capita (GDP , GDPCAP ), capturing the size of the local
market and the purchasing power.
One has to note, that in the case of the intra-country analysis GDP per
capita is probably a better measure of local market potential of the region
than GDP. This is because it is unlikely that the market served by the foreign
12The inclusion of this variable is also inspired by Hanson (1997) who tests on the exam-
ple of Mexican regions, among others, the hypothesis based on agglomeration effects, that
regional nominal wages decrease with growing transportation costs to industry centers. In
order to measure this effect, he includes the distance from Mexico-City and the distance
to US border, approximating the distance to the areas of highest concentration of industry
in Mexico. He finds that both are negatively correlated with wages.
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firm coincides with the boundaries of the region considered. Furthermore,
within one country, without internal borders constituting impediments to
trade, market-seeking FDI will be more likely to settle were potential “deep
pockets” are and not necessarily in the region that is large but not so wealthy.
I expect these variables to be positively correlated with the location decisions
of foreign investors if the geographical destination of foreign firm sales is
the host country market. In the case of export-oriented FDI, local market
potential should have no effect.
Next, I would like to explore the effect of public investment incentives.
The empirical studies have shown that at least in some cases, public incen-
tives are conducive to foreign investment. Considering Poland and other
transition economies, in the first place a liberal regime for foreign investment
had to be established. In Poland the last restrictions like a limited screening
mechanism on foreign investors and limits on foreign ownership in particu-
lar sectors were eliminated in May 1996 following accession to the OECD.13
Furthermore, in order to combat the growing structural unemployment and
support restructuring efforts, in 1995 the Polish government launched an
investment incentive program addressed to domestic as well as foreign in-
vestors. In the course of this program 14 Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
and 2 technological parks have been established, in which business activities
can be conducted on preferential terms. These designed areas can be seen
as enclaves providing not only tax exemptions and customs duty reliefs but
also non-tax incentives related to creation of employment and investment
procedures. This policy instrument is targeted spatially in response to large
disparities in regional development.
As can be seen in Figure 4.8 which shows the geographical distribution of
SEZs, 11 out of 16 voivodships have at least one. Unfortunately, as Cieślik
and Ryan (2005) noted, investment incentives varied between SEZs and over
time. Information about actual extent of public support is also scarce. Thus,
all one can do to account for the effect of this policy is to include a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 when a particular region has at least one SEZ
13Even after 1996 foreign participation was still capped in a few sectors.
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Figure 4.8: The Distribution of Special Economic Zones in Poland
(SEZ). In view of the specific objective of SEZs to attract new investment,
this dummy is expected to have a positive impact on foreign investments.
Finally, as an alternative to DISTEU , I also include covariates measuring
border effects. The vicinity of a country border can influence the presence of
foreign investors in two contradictory ways. First, due to tariffs, additional
transport costs, information cost etc., it can exert a downward pressure on
the trade volume between two neighboring regions of different countries, that
is also on their economic activity.
On the other hand, the removal of national barriers and the development
of greater economic and political trans-border cooperation has led to recon-
sideration of spatial identity and of the definition of regional economies or
markets. As a result of the process of European integration, the Polish bor-
ders in the west will gradually disappear, while those in the east, with Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine, will become even more closed, as an external border of
the EU. This uneven development can have an influence on relative attrac-
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tiveness of certain regions to foreign investors. Border effects are measured
by the length of border a particular voivodship has with the neighboring
country.14
4.4.4 Data
The data set used for analysis in this chapter consists of a balanced panel of
16 Polish regions (voivodships) collected from various statistical publications
of the PSO (Polish Statistical Office) covering the period between 1996 and
2003 (the details on the source of data are to be found in Appendix). It
contains the basic voivodship characteristics as well as data on education,
detailed information regarding the infrastructure network and firms with
foreign participation. The foreign firm sample consists of the manufacturing
sector and the service sector excluding banking and insurance.
An important issue has to be considered regarding this data set: the
Polish regional structure did not remain constant in the period of interest.
On January 1, 1999 a new administrative division of Polish territory was
implemented, where 49 small voivodships were replaced by 16 larger units.
Unfortunately for a researcher the areas of new voivodships emerged as a
result of political interactions rather than by joining several old voivodships.
For this reason, conversion of data for 1998 and earlier years by simple ad-
ditive aggregation would yield inaccurate results. The PSO has published
some data recalculated according to the new regional units back to 1995.
4.5 Results
Equation (4.1) was estimated with different configurations of independent
variables, presented in columns (1) to (6) in Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
In the two first tables the dependent variable is the general measure of
FDI (EMPFOR), while the two other tables estimate export-oriented FDI
(EXPFOR).
14RUS−BORD - Russia, LIT −BORD - Lithuania, BEL−BORD - Belarus, UKR−
BORD - Ukraine, SLO−BORD - Slovakia, CZR−BORD - the Czech Republic, GER−
BORD - Germany, SEA−BORD - sea border
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4.5.1 All Foreign Firms
The first column of 4.4 contains the baseline estimates of effects of local
demand, unit labor costs, infrastructure, labor quality and congestion costs
on employment share of FDI. The following five columns list the coefficients
where distance variables, public incentives and border effects are incorpo-
rated sequentially as follows: columns (2) and (3) include distance variables,
columns (3), (4) and (6) add SEZ dummy, while columns (5) and (6) contain
border effects.
Note that in this table, only GDPCAP is included. From Section 4.3 it
is clear that variables that measure local demand are highly correlated, for
that reason GDPCAP and GDP have been estimated separately. Regression
results containing GDP are presented in Table 4.5.
Turning to estimates, in the baseline model the GDPCAP coefficient
measuring local market potential appears to be positive and statistically sig-
nificant at one percent level. Concerning the ULC coefficient, it has the
expected negative sign but is not statistically significant. Supporting the-
oretical predictions, the result on INFRAST is negative and statistically
significant, POPEDU/POP proves to have a positive and statistically sig-
nificant impact, while the POPDENS coefficient is negative as anticipated,
although insignificant.
The inclusion of distance variables, DISTEU and DISTCAP , in spec-
ification (2) and (3) does not substantially change the results concerning
variables from column (1). Both variables have a negative influence on the
scale of foreign activities, DISTEU is always significant and DISTCAP only
in column (3). That is, the distance to the western border deters location
decisions of foreign firms as expected. Concerning the distance to Warsaw,
from the descriptive analysis it is clear that Mazowieckie voivodship is char-
acterized by the highest share of foreign firms in overall employment, but its
neighboring regions, in particularly those in the east, are not among leaders
in this category. It appears that Mazowieckie alone cannot outweigh the
gravity of the western border.
In specifications (5) and (6) distance variables are substituted with border
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Table 4.4: Location Decision: Employment Share (I)
dependent variable: share of employment in foreign firms in total employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPCAP 0.179*** 0.112** 0.123*** 0.194*** 0.135*** 0.147***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.029) (0.032)
ULC −4.331 −4.845 0.331 −2.561 0.043 0.941
(3.702) (2.961) (2.758) (4.029) (2.182) (2.124)
INFRAST −0.027** −0.026** −0.006 −0.021 −0.019** −0.013
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
POPEDU/POP 0.055* 0.046** 0.066*** 0.061** 0.047*** 0.048***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017)
POPDENS −0.005 0.002 0.004 −0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
DISTEU × year −0.068*** −0.094***
(0.014) (0.015)
DISTCAP × year −0.037 −0.067***
(0.026) (0.025)
SEZ × year 0.153*** 0.046 0.041
(0.038) (0.054) (0.036)
RUS −BORD × year 0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
LIT −BORD × year 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
BEL−BORD × year −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
UKR−BORD × year 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
SLO −BORD × year −0.000*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
CZR−BORD × year 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GER−BORD × year 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
SEA−BORD × year −0.000** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 2.368 697.760 845.579 −55.823 27.589 −12.094
(1.534) (234.064) (222.834) (69.078) (41.301) (63.911)
Adj. R2 0.958 0.971 0.975 0.959 0.983 0.983
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time
fixed effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust
to heteroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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Table 4.5: Location Decision: Employment Share (II)
dependent variable: share of employment in foreign firms in total employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.021*** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
ULC −5.877 −5.319* 0.105 −4.811 −0.751 0.056
(4.293) (2.941) (2.564) (4.707) (2.152) (2.074)
INFRAST −0.026** −0.023** −0.001 −0.022 −0.019** −0.014
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
POPEDU/POP 0.080*** 0.057** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.053*** 0.055***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017)
POPDENS −0.010 −0.002 0.000 −0.010 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
DISTEU × year −0.070*** −0.096***
(0.014) (0.013)
DISTCAP × year −0.028 −0.056**
(0.029) (0.027)
SEZ × year 0.160*** 0.030 0.040
(0.038) (0.057) (0.035)
RUS −BORD × year 0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
LIT −BORD × year 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
BEL−BORD × year −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
UKR−BORD × year −0.000* −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
SLO −BORD × year −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
CZR−BORD × year 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
GER−BORD × year 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
SEA−BORD × year −0.000* −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
constant 4.733 661.474 795.081 −32.738 35.518 −2.360
(1.512) (239.666) (218.928) (72.080) (40.001) (60.760)
Adj. R2 0.955 0.972 0.977 0.955 0.984 0.984
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time
fixed effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust
to heteroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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variables. Also in this case, results for variables common with the first column
are similar. Only the direct proximity to Germany, Czech Republic and less
so to Russia (the coefficient on RUS−BORD is statistically significant at 10
percent level in column (5)) is conducive for FDI. Furthermore, the border to
Lithuania and Ukraine has a positive but not significant effect, while being
close to Belarus, Slovakia, and Baltic Sea is discouraging for multinationals.
This result corroborates findings related to DISTEU , that proximity to the
core of the EU attracts foreign investment.
The attractiveness of the western region of Poland is also a result of
integration of Poland with neighboring regions as part of preparation for the
EU accession. Although the eastern regions were also recipients of funds
for reconstruction, the simultaneous strengthening of the eastern border as
a future EU external border seems to be more important, causing adverse
effects in the east (in regions near to Belarus).
In columns (3), (4) and (6) SEZ, which measures the provision of pub-
lic incentives for FDI, is added. In all three specifications the SEZ coeffi-
cient has a positive sign, but it is statistically significant only in the column
also controlling for distance variables, which agrees with the result obtained
by Cieślik and Ryan (2005). As argued in Section 4.4.3, due to inevitable
data limitations, measurement of the provision of public incentives solely
by dummy variables for special economic zones might be insufficient. In
other words, one must be quite cautious in concluding about the effective-
ness of SEZs formation in attracting FDI based on such a weak measure.
Furthermore, the inclusion of SEZ slightly worsens the explanatory power
of INFRAST .
For the sake of completeness it must be stated that substituting
GDPCAP with GDP in Table 4.5 generally yields similar results, with one
difference. The coefficient of the Ukrainian border (UKR−BORD) becomes
statistically significant and changes its sign to negative.
Summarizing, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that foreign investors in Poland,
above all, value characteristics related to local demand, qualified labor force
and also the proximity to core of the EU. Furthermore, the negative result
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on INFRAST supports the hypothesis, that better infrastructure lowers
transport costs, and therefore enhances the attractiveness of a certain re-
gion for foreign firms. This coefficient, however, is not always statistically
significant. The effect of labor and congestion costs is not clear, since the co-
efficients of both variables assume both positive and negative values and are
predominantly insignificant. As it will be shown in the next section, where a
distinction between market-seeking and export-oriented FDI is made, these
partly inconclusive results are a consequence of a heterogeneous sample of
FDI used in this section.
4.5.2 Market-seeking versus Export-oriented FDI
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 report results obtained with the share of exports in foreign
firms’ revenues (EXPFOR) used as the dependent variable. Again, in the
first table, GDPCAP is included, while in Table 4.7 - GDP .
Recall, that a regression on the share of local sales in foreign firms’ rev-
enues (LOCFOR) would yield coefficients of exactly the same magnitude
and with opposite signs as in the case of export share, therefore the results
are omitted.
The main message of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 is that the determinants of lo-
cation of both types of FDI are indeed different. In the case of EXPFOR,
the GDPCAP coefficient is negative and statistically significant in all spec-
ifications but last. This would imply that wealthiness of the region even
discourages export-oriented FDI. This result, however, could also be an ef-
fect of the dominant LOCFOR variable, as discussed previously. In order
to eliminate this uncertainty, a robustness check is performed in the next
section.
ULC appears to have negative and statistically significant influence on
export-oriented FDI. The estimates of the coefficient on POPEDU/POP are
positive and statistically significant in all columns, which implies that vertical
FDI save on costs but also value a well educated, high quality labor force.
The next variable, the population density, seems to capture the congestion
problem appropriately well since its coefficient is negative and statistically
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Table 4.6: Location Decision: Export Share (I)
dependent variable: share of exports in foreign firms’ revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPCAP −1.109*** −1.332*** −1.252*** −0.932*** −0.570** −0.431
(0.277) (0.370) (0.391) (0.305) (0.277) (0.313)
ULC −100.178*** −98.949*** −59.957* −79.367** −83.353*** −73.026***
(30.604) (29.700) (34.089) (35.116) (22.991) (21.715)
INFRAST −0.200 −0.192 −0.037 −0.127 −0.237* −0.173
(0.125) (0.124) (0.138) (0.135) (0.123) (0.123)
POPEDU/POP 0.876*** 0.813*** 0.963*** 0.949*** 0.525** 0.537**
(0.227) (0.216) (0.246) (0.241) (0.257) (0.259)
POPDENS −0.165*** −0.133*** −0.119*** −0.168*** −0.113** −0.104**
(0.058) (0.050) (0.043) (0.056) (0.045) (0.043)
DISTEU × year −0.334*** −0.525***
(0.126) (0.155)
DISTCAP × year −0.075 −0.299
(0.204) (0.228)
SEZ × year 1.154** 0.538 0.469
(0.450) (0.401) (0.372)
RUS −BORD × year 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
LIT −BORD × year 0.001 −0.006
(0.011) (0.012)
BEL−BORD × year −0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
UKR−BORD × year 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
SLO −BORD × year −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
CZR−BORD × year 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
GER−BORD × year 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
SEA−BORD × year 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
constant 70.038 2896.194 4009.680 −614.518 −1617.715 −2074.143
(14.084) (1882.900) (1983.429) (510.289) (336.874) (537.301)
Adj. R2 0.881 0.893 0.902 0.882 0.834 0.935
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time fixed
effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to het-
eroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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Table 4.7: Location Decision: Export Share (II)
dependent variable: share of exports in foreign firms’ revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP −0.144*** −0.122** −0.104* −0.119*** −0.058 −0.038
(0.037) (0.057) (0.057) (0.039) (0.041) (0.045)
ULC −91.405*** −84.829*** −45.509 −70.286** −79.183*** −68.662***
(29.391) (30.536) (35.845) (33.117) (22.609) (21.299)
INFRAST −0.214* −0.195 −0.036 −0.132 −0.236* −0.164
(0.124) (0.126) (0.141) (0.133) (0.123) (0.123)
POPEDU/POP 0.734*** 0.646*** 0.803*** 0.837*** 0.455* 0.479*
(0.216) (0.213) (0.233) (0.238) (0.253) (0.253)
POPDENS −0.136** −0.117** −0.107** −0.144** −0.106** −0.097**
(0.061) (0.058) (0.049) (0.058) (0.046) (0.043)
DISTEU × year −0.211* −0.398**
(0.119) (0.155)
DISTCAP × year 0.071 −0.133
(0.222) (0.235)
SEZ × year 1.159** 0.585 0.523
(0.469) (0.389) (0.370)
RUS −BORD × year 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
LIT −BORD × year 0.001 −0.007
(0.011) (0.012)
BEL−BORD × year −0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
UKR−BORD × year 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
SLO −BORD × year −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
CZR−BORD × year 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
GER−BORD × year 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
SEA−BORD × year 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
constant 55.824 1206.914 2175.579 −686.207 −1713.956 −2207.527
(12.384) (1900.786) (1964.110) (493.065) (323.857) (518.607)
Adj. R2 0.879 0.887 0.895 0.881 0.933 0.934
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time fixed
effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to het-
eroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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significant in all specifications.
Concerning INFRAST , although this variable is negatively correlated
with EXPFOR as expected, it is significant only in one specification, nar-
rowly exceeding the 10 percent threshold in columns (1) and (2). Among
voivodships with high shares of exports in foreign firms’ revenues there are
two eastern regions characterized by unfavorable infrastructure scores com-
pared to the rest of the country: Warmińsko-mazurskie and Podkarpackie.
In the case of these voivodships, their road or railways connections with
the eastern neighbors may play a bigger role than the infrastructure score
can reveal. Excluding those voivodships from the sample results in a highly
significant coefficient on INFRAST . This indicates that the quality of in-
frastructure is important for exporting foreign firms, but it is by no means a
decisive factor for investment.
Turning to distance variables, both DISTEU and DISTCAP have neg-
ative influence. The former is highly statistically significant in both columns
(2) and (3), while the latter is not statistically significant in any specification.
The result on DISTEU corroborates the expectations that export-oriented
foreign firms are drawn to regions near the western border, where the cost
of transporting goods to the EU core is minimized. The negative sign of
the coefficient on distance to Warsaw depicts a strong export orientation
of two eastern voivodships: Warmińsko-mazurskie and Podkarpackie (which
recorded 47 and 42 percent shares of exports in foreign firms’ revenues, re-
spectively, in 2003).
In columns (5) and (6) the estimates of the border effects are presented. It
turns out that in the case of vertical FDI the coefficients on border variables
for Germany, the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine are positive and sta-
tistically significant. Estimates for Belarus and Slovakia are negative, while
the effect of the sea border is positive, all of them not statistically significant
at any usually accepted levels of significance. Finally, the coefficient measur-
ing the influence of the frontier with Lithuania is insignificant and assumes
both positive and negative values.
There are two notable features of this pattern. First, the proximity effects
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of the western border are proven to be very important again. Second, the
positive and significant influence of the eastern border (in the case of Russia
and Ukraine) supports the argument of the role of Poland as the European
“Gateway to the East”. Because of its geographical position, good railway
and road connections to neighboring countries, inherited from the centrally
planned era, and the relative political stability compared to Russia, Belarus
and Ukraine, the eastern part of Poland is attractive for firms that aim at
exporting to the Eastern Europe.
As already mentioned, the information about the geographical destination
of foreign firms’ exports is not available. It appears, however, that eastern
voivodships are generally deeply involved in trade with the eastern neighbors
of Poland. For example, among trading partners of Podkarpackie, Ukraine
holds the first place.15 Concerning Warmińsko-mazurskie, Russia and other
Eastern European countries ranked second after Germany.16 As for Podlaskie
and Lubelskie, the export share with former USSR countries is 35 and 40
percent, respectively.17 These relatively high shares of exports indicate that
the voivodships mentioned have specialized experience that is necessary for
conducting bussiness on the eastern markets, combined with the advantage of
operating from a stable environment, which could enhance the attractiveness
of regions in the eyes of foreign investors.
Finally, as in the previous section, the coefficient on SEZ is positive and
statistically significant at one percent level in column (3) but it loses its
significance in columns (4) and (6).
In Table 4.7 GDPCAP was replaced by GDP . In general the results
presented in this table are similar to those shown above. Only GDP , as
argued in Section 4.4, turns out to be not such a good measure for local
market potential as GDPCAP , as it is slightly less significant.
15Podkarpacki Serwis Gospodarczy
16See Nowicki et al. (2003).
17See Umiński et al. (2003a) and (2003b).
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4.5.3 Robustness
In this section, EXPFOR was replaced by the share of foreign firms’ exports
in regional global production (EXPFOR/PROD) and the share of foreign
firms’ local sales in regional global production (LOCFOR/PROD) in order
to check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section.
The results obtained are slightly different from those in Section 4.5.2.
It appears that negative coefficients on GDPCAP and GDP are indeed an
effect of domination of local sales. Here in the case of vertical FDI (Table
4.8), consistent with expectations, market potential has no effect on activities
of foreign firms. For horizontal FDI (Table 4.9) the market potential remains
the main determinant. The qualitative influence of ULC remains the same
also for this dependent variable, negative for vertical FDI and positive for
the horizontal one.
As far as the other variables are concerned, the influence of
POPEDU/POP is positive for both types of FDI, but here it is statistically
significant in all specifications for vertical FDI and for horizontal FDI only in
the last two specifications. The INFRAST coefficient takes a negative value
in the case of export-oriented FDI, it is however only partly significant. For
market-seeking FDI INFRAST is never significant and switches its sign.
Congestion costs measured by POPDENS remain to be a deterring fac-
tor for vertical FDI. Additionally, as expected, they also show negative influ-
ence on horizontal investment, significantly so only in column (6). Regarding
the distance variables, the coefficient of DISTEU is negative for both hori-
zontal and vertical FDI, but it is statistically significant only for the latter in
specification (3) containing also SEZ. DISTCAP shows a more interesting
pattern in this section than in the previous one. In the case of vertical FDI it
is even positive and statistically significant in column (2), while it is negative
and insignificant in column (3). Thus, specifications (2) and (3) in Table
4.8 show that export-oriented FDI are rather geographically dispersed, as
we expected. Turning to horizontal FDI, the DISTCAP coefficient is nega-
tive and statistically significant at one percent level, that is it implies forces
drawing market-seeking FDI towards Warsaw.
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Table 4.8: Location Decision: Foreign Firms’ Export Share in Regional Pro-
duction
dependent variable: share of foreign firms’ exports in regional production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPCAP −0.135** −0.070 0.048 −0.048 −0.019 0.069
(0.063) (0.074) (0.066) (0.061) (0.058) (0.052)
ULC −40.785*** −32.308*** −4.677* −31.372*** −23.139** −15.630*
(6.157) (6.048) (2.657) (6.024) (8.765) (8.290)
INFRAST −0.046** −0.046** 0.003 −0.024 −0.044* −0.011
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
POPEDU/POP 0.181*** 0.167*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.135*** 0.143***
(0.042) (0.038) (0.035) (0.042) (0.050) (0.044)
POPDENS −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.021*** −0.033*** −0.020** −0.017**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
DISTEU × year −0.018 −0.111***
(0.024) (0.029)
DISTCAP × year 0.053* −0.038
(0.029) (0.037)
SEZ × year 0.391*** 0.200*** 0.251***
(0.078) (0.066) (0.071)
RUS −BORD × year 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
LIT −BORD × year 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
BEL−BORD × year −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
UKR−BORD × year 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
SLO −BORD × year 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CZR−BORD × year 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GER−BORD × year 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000)
SEA−BORD × year 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
constant 21.243 −135.838 522.318 −236.726 −221.333 −449.396
(4.823) (292.669) (338.917) (84.893) (71.301) (119.483)
Adj. R2 0.906 0.913 0.932 0.914 0.928 0.938
N 128 128 128128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time
fixed effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust
to heteroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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Table 4.9: Location Decision: Foreign Firms’ Local Sales Share in Regional
Production
dependent variable: share of foreign firms’ local sales in regional production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPCAP 1.929*** 1.778*** 1.839*** 2.175*** 1.808*** 1.869***
(0.459) (0.421) (0.436) (0.495) (0.510) (0.521)
ULC 71.470** 31.692 45.883 98.061*** 113.324*** 118.604***
(27.638) (26.718) (33.588) (29.394) (30.535) (32.360)
INFRAST 0.051 0.048 0.073 0.114 0.122 0.145
(0.089) (0.090) (0.101) (0.098) (0.088) (0.097)
POPEDU/POP 0.101 0.162 0.18 0.163 0.453** 0.459**
(0.181) (0.183) (0.178) (0.185) (0.209) (0.211)
POPDENS −0.047 −0.035 −0.040 −0.045 −0.094 −0.099*
(0.047) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.057) (0.058)
DISTEU × year −0.066 −0.003
(0.100) (0.106)
DISTCAP × year −0.650*** −0.588***
(0.231) (0.201)
SEZ × year −0.265 −0.214 −0.399
(0.412) (0.402) (0.403)
RUS −BORD × year −0.005*** −0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
LIT −BORD × year 0.007 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
BEL−BORD × year −0.003 −0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
UKR−BORD × year −0.006*** −0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
SLO −BORD × year 0.003** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
CZR−BORD × year −0.002** −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
GER−BORD × year −0.004 −0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
SEA−BORD × year −0.007** −0.006***
(0.003) (0.002)
constant −32.804 3922.907 3478.020 243.117 1154.117 1516.393
(26.826) (1802.771) (1564.264) (509.037) (340.831) (592.692)
Adj. R2 0.959 0.961 0.961 0.959 0.971 0.971
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; all specifications include voivodship and time
fixed effects; *** (**,*) significant at 1 (5, 10) percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust
to heteroscedasticity; N - number of observations.
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The influence of border variables on vertical investment turns out to be
positive for all but the border to Belarus, with only the Russian (in one
specification), Czech and German borders showing significance. In contrast,
for horizontal investment, almost all borders have negative impact on for-
eign activities. Only the coefficients related to the Slovak and Lithuanian
borders take positive values, the Slovak one significantly. Its positive ef-
fect on market-oriented FDI can be explained by the fact that Ma lopolskie
voivodship, having the longest frontier with Slovakia, contains the large ag-
glomeration of Cracow.
In contrast to the previous section, SEZ shows positive and statistically
significant influence on vertical FDI in all specifications, showing that the
ability of such policies to attract investment is limited to export-oriented
foreign ventures. As the special economic zones were founded in disadvan-
taged regions which are unattractive for market-seeking activities, it comes
as no surprise that their coefficient for horizontal investments is negative and
statistically insignificant.
The econometric analysis presented in the last two subsections confirms
the theoretical predictions concerning vertical and horizontal FDI. It shows
that determinants that influence the costs of conducting business in a given
region are very important for vertical investment. In particular, the export-
oriented FDI combine low labor and congestion costs with high quality of
labor force. Furthermore, in order to lower the transportation costs, those
investments are placed near their destination markets, in Western as well as
Eastern Europe. Additionally, as the robustness check shows, they respond
to regional incentives provided by the government. In contrast, horizontal
FDI are motivated purely by local market potential. They are concentrated
in regions characterized by large market size and high purchasing power,
despite the fact that those locations typically suffer from high labor costs.
4.6 Conclusion
The transition of Poland and other CEE countries from a centrally planned to
market economy coincided with a period characterized by increasing transna-
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tional flows of capital. While the role of FDI in economic development has
been debated at length by its supporters and opponents alike, in Poland
foreign investment is commonly and unquestionably perceived as one of the
major pillars of the national development strategy. Thus, the focus is shifted
to design of effective policies attracting foreign investment to stimulate the
economic activity in disadvantaged regions, and for that purpose, it becomes
crucial to recognize the logic and criteria behind the investment decisions of
multinational firms.
The determinants of FDI can be perceived both from the perspective of
a transnational corporation that undertakes the investment, and in terms of
characteristics of the home country and the host country. This chapter is fo-
cused on the latter and analyzes, which features enhanced the attractiveness
of certain regions in Poland for foreign investments between 1996 and 2003,
based on data extracted from various publications of the Polish Statistical
Office.
For the first time, location determinants of horizontal and vertical FDI
within a host country were analyzed empirically, motivated by theoretical
models describing the different driving forces behind these two types of for-
eign investment. The analysis presented in this chapter supports the theo-
retical implications. It shows that export-oriented FDI are cost-saving in-
vestments, as they choose regions with relatively low labor and in general
operating costs, at the same time preferring locations characterized by a
relatively high quality of labor. The major driving force behind the market-
seeking FDI appears to be the local market potential, defined by its size and
purchasing power, which outweighs the high labor costs, typically accompa-
nying these characteristics.
Also the geographical position of a region plays an important role for
the magnitude of foreign activities. Voivodships located more centrally draw
rather horizontal investments, while the vertical investment is encouraged by
the vicinity of export markets and therefore it is dispersed towards the na-
tional borders. In this respect the western border has a stronger effect than
the eastern one. This finding can have two explanations: one is that in the
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course of EU integration the eastern border of Poland has been strengthened
as a future external EU border, inhibiting cooperation with neighboring re-
gions. The second one is that eastern voivodships are less developed, have
poor infrastructure and exhibit low institutional capacity and as a conse-
quence are less attractive for the the foreign firms. However, inspection
of the dynamic spatial distribution of export-oriented FDI gives the outlook
that Polish regions situated on the eastern border have a potential to become
the “Gateway to the East” for foreign firms.
Due to the data limitations, a final statement about the influence of the
Special Economic Zones could not be derived. The significant results of
the robustness check indicate, however, that such policies are conducive to
vertical, and not to horizontal FDI.
This chapter demonstrates that, given their positive impact on devel-
opment18, export-oriented foreign direct investment can be perceived as a
chance for economically lagging regions in Poland. This is due to the fact
that this type of investment chooses, among others, also locations remote to
agglomerations of economic activity.
18Protsenko (2003) is the only study that distinguishes between the effects of vertical and
horizontal foreign investment. He argues that vertical FDI is “at least as attractive” for
the host country concerning productivity spillovers to domestic firms, R&D expenditures
and employment, as the horizontal counterpart.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.10: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
EMPFOR share of employment in foreign PSO, Dzia lalność Gospodarcza
firms in total employment Spó lek z Udzia lem Kapita lu
Zagranicznego
EXPFOR share of exports in PSO, Dzia lalność Gospodarcza
foreign firms’ revenues Spó lek z Udzia lem Kapita lu
Zagranicznego
LOCFOR share of local sales in PSO, Dzia lalność Gospodarcza
foreign firms’ revenues Spó lek z Udzia lem Kapita lu
Zagranicznego
EXPFOR/PROD share of foreign firms’ PSO, Dzia lalność Gospodarcza
local sales in local Spó lek z Udzia lem Kapita lu
global production Zagranicznego, Produkt Krajowy
Brutto w Przekroju Terytorialnym,
and Bank of Regional Data
LOCFOR/PROD share of foreign firms’ PSO, Dzia lalność Gospodarcza
local sales in local Spó lek z Udzia lem Kapita lu
global production Zagranicznego, Produkt Krajowy
Brutto w Przekroju Terytorialnym,
and Bank of Regional Data
GDP Gross Domestic Product PSO, Produkt Krajowy
Brutto w Przekroju Terytorialnym,
and Bank of Regional Data,
various years
GDPCAP Gross Domestic Product per capita PSO, Produkt Krajowy
Brutto w Przekroju Terytorialnym,
and Bank of Regional Data
ULC Unit Labor Cost PSO, Produkt Krajowy
(annual average wage Brutto w Przekroju Terytorialnym,
divided by productivity, Roczniki Statystyczne
productivity defined as global Województw
production divided by average
employment)
POPEDU/POP share of population older PSO, Bank of Regional Data
than 15, having at least
a secondary degree
137
Definition and Source of Variables, continued
Variable Description Source
POPDENS population density PSO, Bank of Regional Data
INFRAST infrastructure rank PSO, Roczniki Statystyczne
(see Table 4.11) Województw and online
regional database
DISTEU road distance between the main city ViaMichelin, Route Planner
in the region and the nearest major
major border-crossing with
Germany or Austria
DISTCAP road distance between the main city ViaMichelin, Route Planner
in the region and Warsaw
SEZ dummy variable for PAIiIZ
Special Economic Zones
e.g. RUS −BORD the length of border with Russia PSO, Roczniki Statystyczne
Województw
PSO - Polish Statistical Office
PAIiIZ - Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency
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Figure 4.9: Poland in 1831
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Figure 4.10: Poland today
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Table 4.11: Infrastructure Taxonomy of Polish Regions
1995
length of road length of railway telecom 2 telecom 2 infrastructure
road network 1 rank railways 1 rank rank rank
Dolnoślaskie 89.7 3 12.5 2 149.2 7 12
Ślaskie 140.8 1 14.2 1 112.8 14 16
Ma lopolskie 126.8 2 5.9 10 171.3 5 17
 Lódzkie 81.5 6 5.7 11 215.6 1 18
Opolskie 88.5 5 11.2 3 123.1 13 21
Kujawsko-pomorskie 69.9 10 8.4 5 142.8 8 23
Świetokrzyskie 89.5 4 6.3 9 136.4 10 23
Zachodniopomorskie 56.0 13 7.0 8 198.7 2 23
Mazowieckie 76.6 8 5.3 14 183.4 3 25
Wielkopolskie 74.9 9 7.6 7 141.5 9 25
Pomorskie 61.3 12 8.3 6 131.9 11 29
Lubuskie 54.9 14 8.8 4 108.6 15 33
Warmińsko-mazurskie 47.0 16 5.5 12 160.5 6 34
Podlaskie 54.5 15 4.3 16 182.8 4 35
Podkarpackie 77.8 7 5.4 13 93.0 16 36
Lubelskie 68.4 11 4.7 15 131.3 12 38
2003
Dolnoślaskie 90.7 4 9.0 3 366.5 2 9
Ślaskie 161.9 1 18.4 1 316.8 8 10
Ma lopolskie 141.7 2 7.5 4 325.3 7 13
Pomorskie 61.9 12 7.2 5 348.9 3 20
Opolskie 90.4 5 9.1 2 278.0 14 21
 Lódzkie 89.0 6 5.9 10 332.4 6 22
Mazowieckie 78.5 8 4.8 14 375.4 1 23
Wielkopolskie 81.8 7 6.8 7 311.7 10 24
Kujawsko-pomorskie 75.7 10 6.9 6 303.7 11 27
Lubuskie 56.3 14 6.5 8 333.3 5 27
Świetokrzyskie 100.1 3 6.2 9 248.1 16 28
Zachodniopomorskie 56.9 13 5.3 13 333.6 4 30
Podkarpackie 77.6 9 5.3 12 248.8 15 36
Lubelskie 71.2 11 4.2 15 279.2 13 39
Warmísko-mazurskie 50.5 16 5.5 11 301.2 12 39
Podlaskie 52.9 15 3.4 16 314.1 9 40
1 per 100 square km
2 number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants 141
Chapter 5
Summary of Results and the
Contribution of the Thesis
In 1989, Poland, followed by other Central and Eastern European countries,
started the challenging process of transformation from an isolated, centrally
planned economy to an open, market economy. The clear boundary defined
by the fall of communism and the associated reforms created a natural ex-
periment that can serve economists for empirical investigations of numerous
theoretical questions.
In this thesis I also take advantage of these quasi laboratory conditions
to investigate two important issues related to Poland’s transition process
and its growing participation in the global economy. The first part of the
thesis is a contribution to an intense economic debate about the sources of
the observed worldwide increase in relative demand for high skilled labor.
During the last decade, Polish high skilled workers in manufacturing enjoyed
an increase of their earnings compared to low skilled workers, repeating the
earlier experiences of their counterparts from developed countries, at a much
faster pace.
The empirical analysis in the first two chapters of the thesis is the first
complex treatment of theories explaining changes of skill premia in transi-
tion countries. It is dedicated to the question, to what extent the enormous
increase in the skill premium was an effect of Poland’s integration into the
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world economy and bases its explanations on international outsourcing, tech-
nology and international trade.
In Chapter 2 the outsourcing hypothesis was evaluated on the founda-
tion of a model developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a). As described
by this model, activities outsourced by developed countries are relatively low
skilled for the home country and relatively high skilled for the host country
leading to an increase of relative demand for skilled workers in both coun-
tries. According to predictions of the model, direct investments undertaken
by multinational firms were an important explanatory factor for the observed
increase in relative demand for non-production workers in Poland - FDI is
found to have raised the non-production workers’ wage bill share in manu-
facturing by 34 percent between 1994 and 2002.
In Chapter 3, for the purpose of analysis of the role of international
trade and technology in the observed labor market adjustment in Poland,
a two stage approach to zero profit conditions methodology elaborated also
by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) was employed. This method is preferable
to earlier approaches as it allows to identify what structural forces induce
changes in total factor productivity and prices in each industrial sector which
in turn affect factor price changes.
The analyzes have shown that in Poland not only FDI, but also technology
and international trade have contributed to development of wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers. These forces, however, worked in op-
posite directions. While technology has contributed substantially to inequal-
ity growth, export induced a fall in inequality. The latter result confirms the
predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin model showing that in Poland, as a relatively
low skilled labor abundant country, it is this factor that should benefit from
international trade. However, the negative effect of exports on wage dispar-
ity is small compared to the contribution of technology, so that the latter
dominates.
The second goal of this thesis was to identify the determinants of spatial
distribution of activity of foreign firms in Poland between 1996 and 2003.
Since the theoretical literature on FDI suggests that factors governing the
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emergence of horizontal and vertical FDI are different, Chapter 4 analyzes
these two fundamental types of direct investment separately. The empiri-
cal literature on the location choices of FDI accumulated so far seemed to
mostly overlook the need to distinguish between different types of FDI. On
the other hand, empirical studies aimed at testing the validity of horizontal
versus vertical FDI theoretical models were not concerned with the criteria
of location choice within one country. My analysis fills the above gap in the
case of FDI in Poland.
Therefore, in this thesis location determinants of horizontal and vertical
FDI within a host country were analyzed empirically, taking into account
not only factors directly derived from theoretical models describing horizon-
tal and vertical investments, but also controlling for location effects suggested
by the location theory. The empirical analysis agrees well with the theoret-
ical implications, simultaneously confirming the importance of distinction
between horizontal and vertical FDI. It shows that export-oriented FDI are
cost-saving investments, as they choose regions with relatively low labor and
in general operating costs. Additionally, they value locations characterized
by a relatively high quality of labor. The major driving force behind the
market-seeking FDI appears to be the local market potential, defined by its
size and purchasing power.
Furthermore, the geographical position of a region appeared to have an
important role for the extent of foreign activities. The central position of the
region was conducive to horizontal investment, while vertical investment was
drawn by the proximity of export markets and therefore it was concentrated
near national borders, with the western border having a stronger influence
than the eastern one.
This analysis gives decision makers valuable information for design of ef-
fective policies to attract foreign investment in those regions, by demonstrat-
ing that only vertical investment is drawn by economically lagging regions
in Poland. Nonetheless, the location decisions of both types of FDIs should
be subject of further research to investigate the role of local policies and
agglomeration forces. The analysis of the latter will be possible soon - since
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1999, the Polish Statistical Office has been collecting more detailed data on
foreign capital, including its national and sectoral breakdown.
145
Bibliography
Anderton, B. and P. Brenton (1999) “Outsourcing and Low-Skilled
Workers in the UK”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 51 (4), pp. 267 -
85 University of Warwick
Arrow, K. (1962) “Economics of Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention”, Archive for the History of Economic Thought, Canada
Atiken, B. and A. Harrison (1999) “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from
Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence From Venezuela”, American
Economic Review 89, pp. 605-18
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz and A. B. Krueger (1998) “Computing
Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113, pp. 1169-1213
Barrios, S., H. Gorg and E. Strobl (2003) “Multinationals’ Location
Choice, Agglomeration Economies and Public Incentives”, CORE
(Center for Operations Research and Econometrics) Discussion Paper
No. 2003/17 Louvain
Baum, C.F., M. E. Schaffer and S. Stillman (2002) “Instrumental
Variables and GMM: Estimation and Testing”, Boston College Eco-
nomics, Working Paper No. 545
Beck, N., J. N. Katz (1995) “What to Do (and not to Do) with Time
Series Cross-Section Data”, American Political Science Review 89, pp.
634-47
146
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Zachodniopomorskiego”
Polish Statistical Office (various years) “Rocznik Statystyczny
Województw”
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Rynkowa Gdańsk
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